

COMPETING FRAMES? THE WAR ON TERROR IN CAMPAIGN RHETORIC

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Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
Master of Arts
in the Department of Sociology,
Indiana University

June 2007

Accepted by the Faculty of Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincerest and deepest thanks to my advisor, Professor Peter Seybold, without whom this thesis would have been impossible. His enduring belief in my abilities and continued support throughout this project proved invaluable. Under Professor Seybold's guidance, I was able to frame the theoretical concepts and the subject matter into a concise and readable research project that I hope will be of value to others in my field.

I also would like to thank my committee members, Professor Patricia Wittberg and Professor Carrie Foote, who were kind enough to serve on my committee. Professor Wittberg's advice about future directions I should take this research and Professor Foote's sharing of her incredibly extensive knowledge of qualitative research methods contributed to the overall quality of the thesis I was able to produce.

Finally, I would like to thank the members of the Sociology Department whose encouraging words and deeds persuaded me to continue my academic efforts and to complete my degree requirements when my spirits lagged.

ABSTRACT

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The Iraq War and the War on Terror were pivotal issues in the presidential race for the White House in 2004. Competing frames about the meaning of September 11, 2001, terrorism, and American power were constructed by the rival candidates and established a limited debate that marginalized alternative interpretations of war and peace. It is likely that the dilemma over U.S. forces in Iraq and the War on Terror will continue to be a major issue in the upcoming 2008 Presidential Election. Therefore, the campaign speeches of the presidential candidates, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry, during the 2004 Election regarding terrorism were important to understanding the themes that initiated public debate in the U.S. about the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror. In this document analysis, these candidates' public addresses illustrated how the role of the U.S. power to combat terrorism shaped a particular perspective about the post-9/11 world. Ideas that challenged "official" debate about war and national security were excluded from mainstream media coverage of the campaign. In order to examine the narrow debate over terrorism and how alternative "ways of seeing" war have been and continue to be marginalized, this study compared how the candidates framed the war in contrast to anti-war voices. Cindy Sheehan, who is an emergent leader in the peace and social justice movement, and more "official" voices of dissent like Representative Dennis Kucinich, have criticized "official" framing of the

war. Dissenting perspectives about the Iraq War and the War on Terror invite a different understanding about U.S. hegemony, terrorism, and the consequences of the War on Terror for foreign and domestic policies. The impact of the war upon domestic policy and national crises, such as the widely televised and heavily criticized federal response to Hurricane Katrina Summer 2005, were examined to explore how domestic crises undermine “official” framing of the Iraq War and the War on Terror and empower alternative understandings of war and peace.

Key Words: competing frames, September 11, 2001, Iraq War, War on Terror, George W. Bush, John Kerry, hegemony, and the peace and justice movement

Peter Seybold Ph.D., Chair

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INTRODUCTION

Since September 11, 2001, there has been a concerted effort by American politicians to connect the Iraq War to the War on Terror. In the last presidential election, the incumbent President George W. Bush and the challenger, Senator John F. Kerry, engaged in a spirited, but narrowly limited, debate on American foreign policy and homeland security. As mainstream media ownership becomes more concentrated, there is an increasing reliance on “official” sources to define key issues. Thus, what presidential contenders say in an election campaign defines the media’s coverage of important issues, such as the War on Terror. While often disagreeing on other issues, President Bush and Senator Kerry employed similar social constructions to defend U.S. action following September the 11th. Senator Kerry argued that the War on Terror needed to be conducted with broader global support and significant errors had been made when the United States invaded Iraq. However, he did not challenge the ongoing occupation of Iraq or America’s right to use using military force when diplomacy failed in order to defend national security.

Not surprisingly, public perceptions about the Iraq War and the War on Terror appear to have been shaped and defined by politicians speaking in overtly “newsworthy” contexts, perhaps because of increasing reliance on “official” sources by a concentrated and centralized mainstream news media. The shaping effect of such events and their coverage is discernable in the context of the speeches given during the 2004 Presidential Election Campaigns. The candidates’ speeches are studied here in detail, as evidence of the manner in which such “official” political speech and media coverage shape popular conceptions of war and freedom.

Excluded from what the mainstream media defined as acceptable to debate were challenges to the idea of waging the war to promote freedom. John Nichols and Robert McChesney are two of the country's leading media analysts and founders of the national media reform group Free Press. According to McChesney and Nichols (2005), "Some of the best professional journalism plays off the controversy in foreign affairs policy debates among "official" sources. But the debates are almost always tactical, i.e., whether an invasion of Vietnam or Panama or Iraq would best serve U.S. interests, not whether it is moral or legal for the United States to invade those nations" (p. 45).

Even though Democratic primary challenger Howard Dean ran on an explicitly anti-war platform and other Democratic primary candidates such as Dennis Kucinich openly challenged the whole premise of the conflict, the corporate media marginalized such anti-war perspectives in the fall presidential campaign and beyond. Dean was continually mocked in the media after what he referred to as a "pep-talk" to backers following his defeat in Iowa caucuses, began airing around-the-clock on cable news programs as the "I-Have-a-Scream speech" (McChesney and Nichols 2005:117). This reproach caused Dean to reluctantly comment, "I fully understand how events could be warped by the media," (McChesney and Nichols 2005:117). Similarly, the media never considered Kucinich a serious competitor for the American candidacy, but a "fringe candidate" whose views on the war lay too far outside the mainstream for the political punditry of the major news networks to treat him seriously (McChesney and Nichols 2005).

It was only after the war in Iraq dragged on and casualties continued to mount that the initial frames¹ for viewing the War on Terror were challenged. An alternative frame of the Iraq War and the War on Terror gained widespread media attention only after an outraged mother challenged “official” interpretations of the conflict when she lost her son to the Iraq War. This grieving mother, Cindy Sheehan, protested outside President Bush’s ranch in late summer of 2004 and began to break the President’s grasp over the framing of the Iraq War, which he had portrayed as part of the broader War on Terror to convince Americans of the grave threat that Iraq posed. Alternative frames of war oppose the wielding of U.S. military power to enforce democracy abroad and argue that war is not a wise investment of American strength. Advocates of the social justice and peace movement argue that the Iraq War and the War on Terror have depleted social

¹ Framing has been described by media theorists, in general, as a way to interpret world events. Douglas Kellner (2005) describes framing as a “contest of representations,” particularly in political races (p. xv). For Kellner, following the ideas of Antonio Gramsci (1929-35), the media is just one arena where political debate is executed. The media is located in a vast network of cultural and civic institutions that lie outside of the state that provide a “terrain of struggle” for hegemonic groups to achieve their specific goals (Kellner 2005:xv). Michael Schudson (2003) describes this process as a “source of distortion” (p. 48). The “quest for objectivity” is derived from the organization of news stories (Schudson 2003:48). The organization of news stories in media broadcasts and print indirectly causes “official” explanations of events to be favored over alternative ones (Schudson 2003:54). Unlike Kellner, who argues that this “quest for objectivity” gives those in power direct access to shaping and distorting the news in favor of ruling class ideas, Schudson acknowledges that the standards of professional journalism distort events reported by the media, but believes that this occurs regardless of media ownership or whose expertise is called upon to provide a response to world events.

spending on healthcare, education, and other social infrastructure. In addition to dwindling funding for social programs, the movement links the policies that President Bush has implemented to combat terrorism with curbed civil liberties. Ultimately, defending freedom abroad has limited it at home.

The “politics of fear” the President employed during the 2004 Campaign went unchallenged in the media until Sheehan openly criticized him outside his ranch. Prior to Cindy Sheehan’s disputing the President’s tactics to fight terrorism, alternative frames about the War on Terror went virtually unreported in mainstream media. In addition, the widely televised and criticized federal response to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina challenged “official” frames about the success of the War on Terror. The extent of the devastation and the lagging response by government officials exposed latent inequalities inherent in American capitalism. Mass mobilizations have helped alternative frames concerning social justice and war to gain momentum and to challenge the status quo. The nature of the Iraq War and the War on Terror were challenged when veterans joined with Hurricane Katrina survivors and other war resisters in March of 2005 in a broad social justice movement to bring soldiers home and hold the Bush administration accountable for its policies that have undermined America’s reputation as a moral leader at home and abroad. Most recently, the 2006 Congressional Elections ushered in a Democrat majority, which had promised to resolve American involvement in Iraq.

Because of the clear significance of “official” sources to framing public debate about the War on Terror, it is important to examine the range of similarities and differences between how President Bush and Senator Kerry initially conceptualized the

debate over the war. From this analysis, we can observe, more clearly, how policy positions shape the mainstream media's response to issues of war and national security.² It is important to highlight the impact of the candidates' basic agreement on the War on Terror and its objectives upon the media's unwillingness to raise critical questions about how the candidates perceived freedom and democracy. New York Times reporter Frank Rich (2006) examined the media's unwillingness to raise critical questions about the evidence that President Bush and his administration used to build a case for the Iraq War.³ Rich (2006) examined the relationship between his fellow reporter at the paper, Judith Miller, and White House officials and found that her over reliance on "official" sources prevented Miller from investigating President Bush's claim that Iraq was a terrorist threat.

Professional standards of journalism limit the range of legitimate news stories by relying on "official" sources to debate fundamental issues. By failing to contextualize the facts and events of a story, the press does not connect the actions of those in power to a critique of public policy. By avoiding this critique, mainstream media serve the interests of the elite, obfuscating their role as "watchdogs for democracy" (McChesney and Nichols 2005). Beholden to the standards of professional journalism, the media relied on

² For an illustration of how the candidates, and how the media and the candidates interacted to shape the frames the candidates presented about the Iraq War and the War on Terror see Figure 1., Framing Model, following Chapter I.

³ To explore further the relationship between the media and "official" sources, Frank Rich provides an in-depth critique of the relationship between mainstream media and the Bush Administration in his latest book *The Greatest Story Every Sold: the Decline and Fall of Truth from 9/11 to Katrina*.

“official” sources to frame the War on Terror during the presidential campaign and abdicated their role as defenders of the public trust (McChesney and Nichols 2005). Finally, we can examine how media frames of political rhetoric about war come to be undermined and eventually challenged by revelations and events, which questioned the veracity of “suggested” “ways of seeing” justice for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

To uncover the frames utilized by President Bush and Senator Kerry in the 2004 Presidential Campaign debate over the war in Iraq and the War on Terror, I examined the candidate’s public statements found on the following public websites: 1.) www.whitehouse.gov; 2.) www.georgewbush.com; 3.) www.johnkerry.com; and 4.) www.debates.org. (Since this research began, the candidates’ websites have been removed and several of the President’s public statements are no longer available from the White House website. A retrieval source for the candidates’ speeches is located at www.presidentialrhetoric.com. The Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate remains available at the aforementioned debate website (see Chapter III and Appendix A, Tables A1-A3 for further retrieval information). The bulk of this master’s thesis is devoted to analysis of the candidates’ rhetoric to clarify their positions on Iraq and the War on Terror, in order to identify the ideas the candidates used to shape public perception. In the conclusion, I address events subsequent to the campaign, which undermined the dominant frameworks for viewing the war and social justice, and suggest potential areas for future research.

Constructions of social justice during times of war raised the following broad research question. *How did George W. Bush and John F. Kerry frame the Iraq War and relate it to the larger War on Terror in their campaign rhetoric?*

Specific Aims

To examine the social construction of the War on Terror, a comparative case study was conducted to determine the themes President George W. Bush, the Republican nominee, and John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, used during the 2004 Presidential Campaign to frame the debate over foreign policy toward Iraq and the War on Terror. In order to clarify the disputes between these candidates about the way the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror were being conducted, the following is a brief discussion of the foreign policy positions that framed “official” debate during the campaign.

Ken Kyle, a professor who spent a year at the Korean Yonsei University, had the opportunity to examine U.S. foreign policy debate after September the 11th toward North Korea. In the President’s account of the nations that threatened national security not only did he designate North Korea as a member nation of the Axis of Evil, but he also designated Iran and Iraq. Although Kyle focuses primarily on U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea, Iraq is the only nation of the Axis of Evil, thus far, where foreign policy decisions have led to the use of U.S. military force. In addition, since the candidates argued over tactics, not over U.S. involvement in the conflict once the occupation had begun, Kyle’s analysis of U.S. foreign policy leadership is helpful to our understanding of the key differences between the candidates’ policy positions toward Iraq and the War on Terror.

According to Kyle, U.S. foreign policymakers take two positions toward North Korea, progressive liberalism, typically adopted by Democrats, and national security, typically adopted by Republicans (2001). National security discourse is grounded in the assumption that in order for Americans to remain safe in a destabilized world threatened with terrorism, “the United States must act as the world’s policeman” (Kyle 2001:248). George W. Bush’s rhetoric toward Iraq and the broader War on Terror during the campaign was underpinned by national security discourse. By contrast, John Kerry’s rhetoric followed the assumptions of the discourse of progressive liberalism. Progressive liberalism assumes that the U.S. should champion the cause of liberal democracy in the world, but not necessarily through armed conflict, but through coalition building with other Western nations (Kyle 2001). Therefore, if other nations only had the opportunity to choose market capitalism and the rule of law over other forms of political economic governance, they would come to the rational decision of choosing democratic governance (Kyle 2001). The two candidates’ views on the Iraq conflict and the War on Terror fell within these two “official” frames of U.S. foreign policy and reflected different policy positions that are worthy of a comparative case study. The debate between the two men, however, was limited to the candidates’ foreign policy positions on terrorism, which were merely tactical arguments that rationalized American hegemony. These policy approaches marginalized alternative accounts of U.S. involvement in Iraq and the War on Terror during the campaign because the candidates viewed their positions as reflective of the “natural order” of power.

To explore how “official” frames of the War on Terror, and specifically the Iraq War, shaped the candidates’ rhetoric, I examined campaign discourse central to the War

on Terror by conducting a document analysis of public statements. I analyzed national addresses, campaign rally speeches, and the nomination speeches for these two presidential contenders beginning with John Kerry's acceptance of his party's nomination on July 31, 2004 through November 3, 2004, when George Bush made his acceptance speech and John Kerry conceded the election.

This allowed me to complete the following research objectives:

- Describe why terrorism is a threat according to these candidates.
- Identify the role of the U.S. in the global order to combat terrorism, as revealed by public presentations of the Iraq War and the War on Terror by these presidential candidates.
- Explain how the candidates' perceptions of U.S. power set narrow margins around debate over the War on Terror in the 2004 Presidential Election.

The campaign debate established that American hegemony was necessary to combat terrorism. The conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror continue to be polarizing issues in the United States and throughout much of the world. The candidates' rhetoric uncovered the initial frames for viewing Iraq and the War on Terror. These frames continue to influence public understanding about the occupation and the threat terrorism poses.

This allowed me to complete the final research objective:

- Increase sociological understanding of how America's political leaders use the nation's founding principles to define the role of U.S. power to shape legitimate public debate about the War on Terror.

Studying the presidential candidates' competing frames and their public presentations of the War on Terror allowed me to examine how terrorism is socially constructed to present U.S. hegemony as the "natural order." Thus, the candidates assumed that the only means for freeing the world from terrorism was the ideology of

American hegemony. The maintenance of idea that the United States has the power to liberate the world from tyranny is based upon its founding principle, freedom, and therefore, explains why foreign policy continues to be dominated by the perpetuation of U.S. power abroad.

Significance

This research is timely and significant for the following reasons. First, since the War on Terror is a recent phenomenon that appears will continue sometime into the future, it warrants investigation. Similar to the Cold War, the War on Terror is ostensibly without end. Throughout this study, I explored how the candidates' social constructions of Iraq and the War on Terror framed the debate about the necessity of U.S. hegemony. This is an area bound to become a larger area of study in academia as alternative frames to the "official" debate continue to arise in the United States and as nations and as ideological groups battle for hegemony over the world stage.


Second, this research increases our understanding of the foreign policy perspectives that informed the debate between the two major parties in the United States, the Republican, and the Democratic Parties, regarding the War on Terror, while simultaneously marginalizing the alternatives to waging a War on Terror to suppress terrorism.

Third, this study builds on the existing literature of discourse analysis and case studies of George W. Bush and other politically significant individuals. This research is significant because it is a case study of how presidential candidates used the role of U.S. power to frame the debate over the War on Terror in order to not only sway public opinion in favor of their strategy, but to advance U.S. hegemony. Since, these two men

represent somewhat different political perspectives, their view of U.S. foreign policy toward terrorism varied accordingly.

Fourth, this study differs from prior research since I will examine the public statements of George W. Bush and John Kerry to illuminate not only how political philosophies compete to determine the global order, but how these candidates set the initial debate over the frames that continue to dominate “official” interpretations of the Iraq War and the War on Terror. Public presentations of war are sociologically significant because gaining public consensus and obtaining public support are needed to establish the authority to launch war and guide analysis of world events. This research will contribute to political sociology in the tradition of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and will use French social theorist Emile Durkheim’s theory on collective consciousness to explain how mass consciousness is informed and shaped by hegemony.

Figure 1 – Frame Model



The Framing Model⁴ conceptualizes the debate over competing frames about the War on Terror and hostilities in Iraq that President Bush and Senator Kerry engaged in during the

⁴ Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman provide an informative discussion of the effect that the mass media has upon the information that is critical to public policy in the introduction to their book, *Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media*. They present a model of the major news media that is dominated by the political and corporate elite that seek to limit the range of opinion by marginalizing ideas

2004 Election Campaign. The inner part of the diagram illustrates how this study examined debate between the President and the Senator without the intervening variable of the media. The outer part of the diagram illustrates the influence that the media and the candidates had in shaping the debate over the Iraq War and the War on Terror.

that challenge "official" sources through the use of "news filters." The authors argue that the filters the elites use to control the news that reaches the public have the five following characteristics: (1) news markets are experiencing increasingly concentrated ownership and are oriented toward profit; (2) the primary source of income flows from commercial interests; (3) over reliance on government and business approved "experts"; (4) "flak", or threatening and disciplining of journalists who fail to follow the industry's "professional standards" of journalism, which includes presenting both sides of an issue without critical analysis; and (5) "anticommunism" to set the parameters of acceptable debate (antiterrorism could easily be interchanged with anticommunism, since its function is to question the patriotic impulses of the major news media's reporters.)

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Previous sociological studies have examined the President's role during the weeks following September 11, 2001 in determining the U.S. foreign policy toward terrorism in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These studies did not examine the debate between presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry over Iraq or the War on Terror during the 2004 Election at home and abroad. Although they found that U.S. power is founded upon the moral authority to dictate the global order because that nation's birthright has its basis in freedom, they failed to address that its leaders also hold power because they are aligned with potent political and economic forces that are central to defining the meaning of freedom. Although some of these studies address foreign policy perspectives that present U.S. hegemony as common sense or the "natural ordering" of the world, they do not present a broad discussion of American hegemony and its consequences for a critical public debate about the meaning of freedom and moral action. Nevertheless, prior analyses of American power were helpful to this research project. Their analyses of how rhetoric shapes the authority of opinion leaders to interpret crises, like 9/11, aided my understanding of how the candidates' speeches facilitated a narrow debate and legitimized U.S. authority and leadership in the fight against terrorism.

Because agreement over U.S. power is consensual, presentations of American hegemony on the global stage must be maintained by reproducing a limited debate that reinforces the necessity of U.S. leadership to resolve international crises. The candidates presented a limited debate based upon an "official" understanding of foreign policy that

presumes America acts in the best interest of freedom. Missing from this debate were alternative “ways of seeing” war. Chalmers Johnson, a scholar and former military consultant to the CIA views the militarized response to 9/11 through the lens of “empire.” According to Johnson⁵ (2004), the social organization of power is based upon a “network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities” (p. 5). According to Johnson (2006), the organization of U.S. hegemony is “kept separate from what passes for everyday life” (p. 5). Because a militarized culture has been developed within the infrastructure of American society, it is possible for U.S. leaders to convince the public of the need to launch wars and to protect American interests abroad without a deep reflection upon the morality of imperialism. Unless elite power becomes undermined by events, such as the mounting number of American casualties in Iraq, interpretations of U.S. power that counter American foreign policy directives do not gain widespread acceptance. Although alternative frames exist regardless of whether elite hegemony is managed successfully or unsuccessfully, they only gain traction when “official” frames fail to produce favorable public opinion about U.S. power. Initially, the candidates’ frames about terrorism resonated with the American public as common sense understanding, but gradually these frames have become disputed in the mass consciousness as valid goals to safeguarding national security and promoting freedom abroad.

⁵ Chalmers Johnson provides an insightful understanding of American hegemony in the introduction to his book *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*.

The dual lenses of hegemony (Gramsci 1929-35) and collective consciousness (Durkheim 1895) reveal how mass consciousness is maintained, reproduced, and challenged in the post 9/11 cultural landscape. The study of hegemony in the current era not only demonstrates how alternative frames challenge beliefs about terrorism; but also how they uncover the mechanisms that foreign policy makers have used to maintain and reproduce their authority over the interpretation of the 'long' War on Terror. The concept of collective consciousness helps to reveal how these frames resonated in mass consciousness and how these have been accepted, modified, or rejected by Americans.

According to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1929-35) who was imprisoned for his revolutionary ideas by the fascist government of Mussolini, hegemonic projects are the "political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure," through which the ruling class attempts to maintain and reproduce their cultural domination over the interpretation of the ideas of that society" (Joseph 2003:52). Hegemonic groups, such as the two dominant political parties during the last presidential election, are motivated to retain their position of power in the political system and therefore seek to define the dimensions of the debate. However, according to Gramsci, the ideas of the ruling elites and their political parties are open to challenge in democracies because hegemony is most effective when the ruling class's ideas are willingly accepted by the masses and not forced upon them from above (Joseph 2003). Elite political power is limited and can be undermined by structural contradictions. Ideas that initially supported the elite's ability to dominate the debate can be challenged by groups who have crafted a different interpretation of the social and economic conditions of a society. For example, events that proved beyond their control, like the response of

the Iraqis to the removal of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent mismanagement of the reconstruction of Iraq, can undermine the hegemonic political power of the ruling class over the American public. At such moments, the opposing ideas of other groups, like the anti-war movement, have the power not only to influence public opinion, but also to shape the foreign policy debate.

In order to maintain their political power, the elite have attempted to “cure, within certain limits,” and to legitimate the political crisis created by the prolonged war in Iraq, which many of them had initially authorized with little debate. In November 2005, U.S. Representative Jack Murtha, a decorated Vietnam War veteran who originally supported the war in Iraq, started calling for immediate troop withdrawal. The Washington Post reported that Representative Murtha described the war as “a flawed policy wrapped in illusion” and warned policy makers of the shift in public sentiment against the war at a press conference in Washington on November 17, 2005 (p. A1). In the 2006 Congressional Election, this shift was apparent as many members won seats based on their opposition to continuing the President’s strategy to fight the Iraq War, as well as President Bush’s handling of many domestic concerns and the lack of public accountability by the nation’s elected officials.

Collective consciousness reveals how the “public mind” negotiates the debate between hegemonic projects by traditional authorities, such as government “officials” and political candidates, and counter-hegemonic projects by alternative forms of

authority, such as social justice organizations like CODEPINK⁶. The anti-war and social justice movement is a counter-hegemonic group of various grassroots organizations that question the veracity of military spending, while millions of Americans do not have access to appropriate healthcare and education. The movement argues that if the internal infrastructure of the United States continues to be dominated by the military-industrial complex⁷, the nation will fail to function as a republic.⁸ Leaders like Medea Benjamin⁹ have worked with Cindy Sheehan to link military spending for the war to under-funded social programs that assist to end poverty, discrimination, and social inequality. Just as Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960s successfully linked war to poverty in his opposition to the Vietnam conflict, Cindy Sheehan of Gold Star Mothers for Peace has raised awareness about the same social justice issues. She has sought to unite anti-war protestors and Katrina survivors in common cause with the help of other organizations involved in the United for Peace and Justice Network.¹⁰

⁶ CODEPINK works to end the Iraq war and prevent future wars through political protests by drawing attention to the lack of resources given to education and healthcare.

⁷ For further clarification, see prior discussion about “empire” on pp. 14-15.

⁸ For a general discussion about the danger of empire see author and playwright Gore Vidal’s book *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*. The author provides a broad overview of the consequences for civil liberties and the founding principles that America fights to defend, if the growth of the military-industrial complex remains unabated.

⁹ Medea Benjamin also works for Global Exchange, an international human rights organization, and is a recognized anti-war movement leader.

¹⁰ The demands of the forged alliance culminated between anti-war groups and hurricane survivor’s organizations (Veterans for Peace, Iraq Veterans Against the War, Vietnam Veterans Against the War,

The emerging social movement is in opposition to many elected officials' ideas about social justice and equality. At a massive anti-war demonstration organized by member groups of the United for Peace and Justice Network for the "Bring Them Home Now Tour,"¹¹ a cross-country bus tour, which began at President Bush's Ranch on August 31, 2005, culminating in a march in Washington, D.C. on September 24, 2005, Sheehan rallied the movement. Sheehan declared "We are here today to tell you that we are a majority and we will never rest until you bring our young people home from the Middle East and until you start putting money into rebuilding our communities: the ones natural disasters destroy with your help, and the ones which your callous and racist war economy are decimating. We won't allow you to take any more money out of social programs to finance Halliburton to rebuild the Gulf States: there is no money" (2005).

Military Families Speak Out, Gold Star Families for Peace, Save Ourselves, the People's Hurricane Relief Fund, Common Ground Collective, Bayou Liberty Relief, the Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance, C3, and others) in the "Walkin' to New Orleans—Veterans and Survivors March for Peace and Justice," in March 2006 were: "1) the immediate return of our troops from Iraq, and a call for U.S. tax dollars to be spent on human priorities at home; and 2) the rebuilding of the devastated Gulf Coast, under the democratic direction of the residents of the Gulf Coast, instead of the illegal occupation of Iraq."

¹¹ The "Bring Them Home Now Tour," was organized Gold Star Families for Peace, Iraq Veterans Against the War, Military Families Speak Out, and Veterans For Peace, groups who count veterans and military families as part of their membership. The Tour began on August 31, 2005 from the President's ranch in Crawford, Texas and ended with a rally in Washington D.C. on September 24, 2005 featuring Cindy Sheehan, a member of Gold Star Families for Peace.

The movement disputes “official” frames about equality and opportunity, the free-market, and foreign policy. The social justice movement values equality of conditions and not just opportunity, social needs over free enterprise, and a grassroots approach to local governance. On January 28, 2007, groups like CODEPINK, affiliated with United for Peace and Justice returned to Washington, D.C. to call for an end of U.S. hostilities in Iraq and to pressure the newly elected Democratic Congress to oppose the President’s proposals to increase troop deployment and funding for the Iraq War. The Washington Post reported that congressional leaders such as Democratic Representative Dennis J. Kucinich of Ohio, as well as Democratic Representatives Maxine Waters and Lynee Woolsey of California spoke in opposition to the President’s recent request of Congress (2007). According to the Washington Post (2007), the former Democratic Senate Leader Tom Daschle made this remark about the anti-war rally “Its primary value is that it keeps up the pressure. There is a sense that by summer, a march like this will be two or three times as large” (p. A1).

Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony (1929-35) explain the process by which certain ideas, beliefs, and attitudes are transmitted to the public and framed Americans’ response to terrorism. The impact of American hegemony and ideas that counter “official” interpretations that shift public opinion illustrate Emile Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness (1895). Since the power of hegemony rests in moral action and the collective consciousness is sensitive to moral ambiguity, the impact of competing ideas about the “right” use of American power upon the “public mind” explains how opposing ideas, beliefs, and attitudes about freedom and democracy

develop. Competing frames about American hegemony engage the “public mind” and therefore influence public perceptions of the War on Terror and anti-war sentiment.

For the purpose of understanding Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness and arguing for the synthesis of Gramsci’s and Durkheim’s ideas about mass consciousness, I am assuming that Durkheim’s concept is illustrated by public opinion polls about the President’s handling of the War on Terror and the Senator’s proposal to fight this war more effectively. Public opinion polls assume that Americans were influenced by the candidates’ social construction of the War on Terror; and thus signify that the frames employed by the candidates either were maintained in the public consciousness or were disputed in the public consciousness. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2004) reported that a majority of those polled approved of the President during the campaign (56%), while the Senator’s approval rating of those polled, was lower (47%) (11 November). Since hegemonic power is primarily consensual, the way the President and the Senator framed U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and the War on Terror to combat terrorism had to be reproduced in order for the candidates to maintain their authority as presidential hopefuls.

It is noteworthy that the President’s overall approval rating, which included surveying public perceptions of U.S. involvement in Iraq and the President’s handling of domestic concerns, declined following the 2004 Election. According to the Center (2004): “Just half see the military effort in Iraq going very or fairly well, while nearly as many (46%) say things are not going well” (December). Although Americans were divided over the President’s decision to invade Iraq, a majority (56%) believed the U.S.

should remain committed to stabilizing Iraq (The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2004:20 December).

Since hegemonic power is consensual, the shift of American's "collective consciousness" since late 2004 has been gradual, as social constructions of war have lost their effectiveness when subsequent events, such as Hurricane Katrina, challenged the dominant frames that leaders, like the President, reproduced to win re-election. The President's framing of the War on Terror reproduced and maintained his authority to lead. However, the President's hold over the debate on the War on Terror in Iraq has lessened in the collective consciousness. The President's poll numbers signify this shift as his approval ratings have continued to decline since the 2004 Election. On October 13, 2005 the Center reported that the "...president's overall job approval rating has slipped to 38%. And on a number of issues, ranging from the federal budget deficit to relations with U.S. allies, majorities or pluralities say that Bush's policies have made things worse, not better." In addition, in the same report, the Center (2005) stated, "For the first time since the war began, a majority of Americans (53%) say the U.S. military effort there is not going well. Half of Americans now say the decision to use military force in Iraq was wrong, up from 44% last month. Support for keeping U.S. forces in Iraq, which had remained stable over the past year, also has declined. As many Americans now say the U.S. should bring its troops home as soon as possible as favor keeping the troops there until Iraq is stable (48% vs. 47%)" (13 October). The President's overall approval rating reached its lowest point of thirty-three percent in March 2006 (The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press).

The President's approval rating has significantly declined since his re-election, as his hegemonic power over the social construction of the War on Terror in Iraq has become more difficult to reproduce and maintain. The most recent polling report available from the Pew Center (2007) on American involvement in Iraq found that "Fully two-thirds of Americans (67%) say things are not going well with the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and solid majorities say the U.S. is losing ground in preventing a civil war (68%), reducing civilian casualties (66%), and defeating the insurgents militarily (55%)" (15 February).

The public response to the dispute between President Bush and Senator Kerry over Iraq and the War on Terror during the 2004 Campaign and to subsequent U.S. involvement in Iraq can be understood by analyzing the dynamics between "official" frames and public opinion. Both social theorists, Antonio Gramsci and Emile Durkheim, provide an analytical starting point to uncover how national debate over terrorism and 9/11 illustrates that social cohesion is dependent on obtaining public consensus over crises that impact society. However, the two theorists differed on how public attitudes influence social cohesion and the maintenance of consensus among members of society. Gramsci's theory of hegemony makes meaning of campaign debate over the War on Terror by examining how those in places of power in the political and economic system are in a unique position to define America's response to terrorism. Specifically, the state must present a leader who maintains the supremacy of a social group in two ways. First, the leader must dominate the intellectual and moral debate surrounding the terrorist attacks. Second, for leadership to be successful, the dominant group must be located in the "nucleus of economic activity" (Joseph 2006:47-48). Therefore it "does not

[naturally] flow automatically from the economic position of the dominant group...it has to be constructed and negotiated...it has to take into account the interests of those groups which it is exercised” (Joseph 2006:48).

The 2004 candidates’ speeches operated like traditional call-to-arms-texts, which are used to establish a leader’s authority to dominate the interpretation of events during war. In order to win election to the presidency, the candidates had to persuade the American public that voting for them was in the nation’s interest to effectively lead the War on Terror. Call-to-arms texts are intended to establish and maintain power by “convincing people, en masse, to kill and die on behalf of some cause or other” (Graham, Keenan, and Dowd 2004:200). At the same time, these texts function to sustain and maintain the leader’s power in the social structure during wartime (Graham et al. 2004). The candidates’ public statements served to establish their authority to frame events since 9/11 in order to persuade the public that their leadership was essential to the successful culmination of the conflict in Iraq.

Gramsci (1930-32) argued that groups establish hegemony through the “war of positions” by recognizing that in order to win state power, political leaders, such as the candidates, must “already play a leading role in civil society and must already be culturally, politically and ideologically influential,” before they are in a position to establish their political supremacy (Joseph 2006: 53). This is demonstrated by the survey results following the first 2004 Presidential Campaign debate on homeland security and foreign policy where Iraq and the War on Terror were the pivotal debate points. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found in a public opinion poll taken a few days after the first debate that the President maintained an approval rating of forty-eight

percent over the Senator's forty-one percent. According to the Center (2004), although a majority of those polled believed that Kerry won this debate, the President's strategy to fight the War on Terror in Iraq remained preferable to Senator's strategy:

Voters are divided over whether Bush has made "major misjudgments" on Iraq and the war on terror: 47% say he has, while 47% believe he has not. And there is a similar split on the question of whether Kerry would give America's allies too much say in U.S. foreign policy decisions: 39% think Kerry would give the allies too much say, while slightly more (43%) say he would not. (4 October)

Perhaps the vivid images on and after September the 11th, such as photos of the President at Ground Zero with a bullhorn speaking to recovery workers, became etched in the collective consciousness. Thus, Senator Kerry, who "won" the debate on foreign policy and homeland security, failed to influence public opinion significantly. Possibly the Senator was unable to shift public opinion more in his favor because the images of the President after 9/11 were too strongly burned into the "public mind." On the other hand, perhaps, Senator Kerry failed to loosen President Bush's grasp over the debate that informed national discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 because he was unable to articulate a sufficiently clear position for him to be considered an effective wartime president.

The President revived this image in his Republican Nomination Speech and several late September and mid-October rally speeches. The following excerpt is from a campaign rally on September 20 in New York City:

I want to tell you, I assure you that I'll never forget the day that Rudy and George and I were in the ruins of the Twin Towers. It was September the 14th, 2001. It's [sic] a day that – that day might as well have happened yesterday as far as I'm concerned. It is still so vivid in my memory, particularly the workers in the hard hats screaming at all of us, particularly me, I think [sic], "Whatever it takes." That's what they were yelling at the top of their lungs. We did our best to console people, to hug people, to cry with people, to thank people for their work. A guy looked me right in the eye and he said, "Do not let me down." (177-183)

The campaign rhetoric illustrates how the candidates' speeches provided both the President and the Senator with an opportunity to state their position and engage in a "war of positions" (Gramsci 1930-32). President Bush and Senator Kerry had to negotiate consensus with the American public over Iraq and the War on Terror in order to win election. Gramsci's "war of positions" between hegemonic projects provides understanding to what occurred between the candidates as they vied for election to the White House (1929-30). The aims and strategies to combat terrorism and fight the Iraq War represent a "war of positions" that occurred between these two candidates. The nature of the U.S. power and the War on Terror was defined by these men as they laid out their aims and strategies to defend American lives and freedom from the terrorist threat. They presented an interpretation of the War on Terror in Iraq, which reflected an America foreign policy debate dominated by "official" views of the conflict.

Butt, Lukin, and Matthiessen (2004) addressed the construction of discourse that legitimizes and endorses a particular social construction of war. Their study analyzed how the President established an ideology that devalued the lives of terrorists, in order to gain public consensus and support for the war effort to liberate Iraq. He demonized Saddam Hussein and linked him to Al-Qaeda and the broader War on Terror to legitimize the initiation of an attack on Iraq (Butt et al. 2004). This strategy continued to frame the debate over the war during the 2004 campaign. The President continued to connect Saddam Hussein to terrorism, while the Senator searching for a legitimate response to the invasion of Iraq attempted to oppose President Bush's framing of this debate. Even as the Senator refuted the President's justification for the invasion, the Democratic candidate's strategies to fight terrorism were guided by the foreign policy objectives of

the Washington Establishment. When President Bush responded to 9/11 with the War on Terror he created an image of honorable Americans and dishonorable others, including Americans who were against pre-emptive war to persuade the public of the immediacy of the threat of terrorism (Murphy 2003).

Coe et al. (2004) examined how the President framed a response to 9/11 to establish the authority to dominate the meaning of the attacks. President Bush used the actions of the terrorists on 9/11 as the centralizing concept to provide a foundation from which to interpret these events: for example, good/evil, and security/peril. Manheim (1991, 1994) defined this as strategic political communication (Coe et al. 2004). The erection of binary opposites and strategic political communication are tactics used to establish the hegemony of a leader's moral and ethical leadership. World leaders employ binary discourse with the goal of creating, controlling, distributing, and using mediated messages as a political resource (Coe et al. 2004:247). Anita Lazar and Michelle Lazar (2004) examined the War on Terror as a continuation of the rhetoric of the New World Order (NWO) that dominated the first President Bush's and President Clinton's years in office throughout the 1990s. The rhetoric of the NWO employs binarism to focus on the immoral actions of the enemy, while ignoring immoral acts committed by the U.S. in order to project America moral authority in the world (Lazar and Lazar 2004). The construction of Arabs as enemies justifies organized violence (Merskin 2004) and prepares the ground for future violence (Leuder, Marshland, Nekvapil 2004). This was a useful hegemonic device to set the terms of the debate over the U.S. role in the fight against terrorism (Lazar and Lazar 2004). The candidates constructed their opposition to terrorism not only to place themselves in moral opposition to terrorists, but also to place

themselves in opposition to one another as well. When they questioned the feasibility of their opponent's strategy to win in Iraq and the War on Terror, they set the margins of debate over the tactics used to fight terrorism. Unlike other potential political leaders whose views lay too far outside the mainstream of political thought, these candidates were aligned with the Washington Establishment prior to announcing their candidacy. Their positions in Washington conferred upon them "insider" status and thus, they were in a unique position to shape public debate about these events.

Their candidacies for the presidency gave both President Bush and Senator Kerry unique access to the "public mind." This position afforded them the opportunity to determine how U.S. hegemony was wielded in the ongoing conflict with Iraq; a position that framed "official" debate and marginalized competing frames in the public arena. The campaign provided a public space through which these potential leaders of the state could display their plan to win the war against terrorism and establish their hegemonic position. As the only two credible contenders for the American presidency, they were able to define the terms under which the U.S. possessed the legitimacy to fight a broad War on Terror. In their 2004 campaign speeches, not only did the candidates depict American power as essential to combating terrorism, but they portrayed themselves as stewards of America's moral leadership at home and abroad.

Since presidential campaigns are located in the body of the state and the state is the organizing body of hegemony, these two candidates were in a position to "operate through a wide terrain," of civil and cultural institutions located outside the state, including the mass media that, according to Gramsci, reproduce state hegemony (Joseph 2006:46-47). The candidates had access to conglomerate media outlets and had the

opportunity to influence public opinion when they sparred over the presidency in nationally televised debates, and when they received frequent news coverage of their activities on the campaign trail. Each was in a unique position to produce hegemony and craft a narrow debate about the War on Terror. Americans could pay close attention to not only the President's and the Senator's campaign rhetoric, but to the media's coverage of them as well. Drawing on Gramsci's model of hegemony, these institutions (the state and the mass media) helped the President and the Senator shape what September the 11th meant for America's response to terrorism, the War on Terror and Iraq.

Durkheim's theory of collective consciousness explains the process by which the candidates influenced public opinion. Durkheim's (1895) conceptualization of this process uses "social facts" and explains how social constructions, like the War on Terror, are introduced into mass consciousness and, if repeatedly encountered on a large scale, these eventually shape the collective consciousness to believe in the sanctity of American power (Goodwin and Scimecca 2006). Once the margins of debate were set in the context of binary opposites (Coe et al. 2004), such as the relationship between good and evil in the post-9/11 world, these became firmly entrenched in the public psyche. Although these authors applied this principle to President Bush as he constructed the U.S. response to terrorism in the immediate weeks following the attacks, it can be applied similarly to both candidates to illustrate how they established the authority to define the "official" debate over terrorism in their 2004 bid for the presidency. They only had to refer briefly to their strategies to fight the War on Terror to reinforce their candidacy in opposition to terrorism. For Durkheim (1895) social facts are representations or "ways of seeing" that shape our consciousness (Goodwin and Scimecca 2006). As 24/7 news

coverage of Iraq and the War on Terror continued and the election rose to prominence in the mainstream media reporting in summer and fall 2004, the candidates were in a unique position to set the margins of debate about terrorism. This provided the two major parties' contenders with the ability to shape the meaning of 9/11 and terrorism to influence our "understanding in association with the data we receive[ed] through our senses to constitute reality" (Jones 2001:66). "Shared ways of seeing" were created that became central to understanding ourselves in relation to the candidates' representations of ourselves as Americans, as well as understanding our common enemies, terrorists. (Jones 2001). These collective representations formed a shared basis of knowledge about terrorism during the 2004 election, which ordered our chaotic post-9/11 world of competing visions of patriotism and labeled ideas that lay outside of political party definitions as un-patriotic.

Collective consciousness is ultimately relational for Durkheim (1895). It is a "moral phenomenon" upon which social order and group solidarity is built around personal relations that signify "reciprocity of rights and responsibilities" among individuals (Jones 2001). America had found a new mission, making the world safe from terrorism, and "a conception of shared reality" (Durkheim 1895) entered into the American psyche after September the 11th (Joseph 2001). Flags were prominently displayed in many front yards, prayer vigils were held, and denunciations of the hijackers' actions were pervasive in the public space. As the 2004 election campaign commenced between the major parties' nominees, the meaning of the 9/11 attacks initially crafted and dominated by the President, became challenged by the Senator in a narrow debate over the tactics to fight terrorism. The candidates used the events of 9/11

and the War on Terror to place the Iraq War in the context of “past, present, and future violence” (Leuder et al. 2004:244). This debate not only presented narrow interpretations of September the 11th, but it also served as a way to gauge the candidates’ fitness to lead the country in the war against terrorism. Questions surrounding the Senator’s service in Vietnam and the President’s simultaneous service in the Texas Air Guard, as well as their “official” records in public office, became the foundation for examining the legitimacy of each man’s claim to having the ability to execute the role of Commander in Chief in a time of war.

Since September the 11th, American political leaders, in general, have used the War on Terror to shape the worldview of Americans and consequently to establish U.S. hegemony in a global fight against terrorism. The presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry constructed a world in which U.S. power reigned supreme and the only alternative to making the world safe from the fear of terrorism was the War on Terror. The only disputed claims between these candidates were whether Saddam Hussein had posed a threat to American security prior to the occupation and how to win the Iraq War to eliminate the power of militant Islamists and their terrorist organizations. The opposition candidate, Senator Kerry, never questioned American hegemony, and although he frequently criticized the legitimacy of the initial reasons the President had given for invading Iraq, he never questioned the White House’s militarized response to terrorism. Instead, he laid out his own military strategy to end the conflict in Iraq and fight the War on Terror, and argued for a broader coalition of nations to fight the war. Deciding the role of U.S. power has been inherent to the social construction of this war. Therefore, the analysis of the candidates’ rhetoric illustrates how these presidential

aspirants not only socially constructed and explained the war and the best strategies to fight it in order to legitimize American hegemony at home and abroad; but it also provided the initial frames that continue to inform congressional and public debate.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The qualitative method document analysis was applied to analyze the campaign rhetoric of presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry specifically to uncover the candidates framing of the Iraq War and the War on Terror. This study was guided by an interpretivist philosophy of science to explain the process of how the meanings of ideas like terrorism are negotiated through social interaction. In this instance, elections were under investigation. Interpretivism was applied to the candidates' speeches to demonstrate that the candidates sought to influence public opinion by making meaning of the U.S. response to the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and terrorism. The President and the Senator socially constructed the Iraq War and the War on Terror in their public statements that framed public debate. Interpretivism (Esterberg 2002) argues that "humans act toward things based on the meanings those things have for them," and that these meanings, "arise out of social interaction...and...are created (and changed) through a process of interpretation" (p. 16). The 2004 Presidential Campaign rhetoric about terrorism was a process of interpretation over America's role in the global fight against this threat that shaped public response to the candidates' competing worldviews. Simultaneously, this process marginalized dissenting worldviews that did not advocate a militarized response to terrorism and questioned the veracity of "official" "ways of seeing" the War on Terror. The candidates were in a unique position to create meaning about terrorism because they negotiated their particular explanation of the U.S. role in the fight against terrorism with the public in their campaign rhetoric.

Document analysis has several advantages over quantitative methods, since it is an unobtrusive method. According to Raymond M. Lee (1992, 1994, 2000, and 2002), who has written several methodological books on the use of unobtrusive research methods to examine sensitive topics in the social sciences field, document analysis results in thick descriptions of social phenomenon and provides the researcher the opportunity to study actual behavior in depth. Since the War on Terror is a highly emotionally charged issue, examining political speeches about the threat of terrorism using the texts of campaign rhetoric is non-disruptive (Lee 2000) and minimizes the risk of harming human subjects. Since the candidates' public statements continued to be available on the internet after the 2004 Election at presidentialrhetoric.com,¹² a project website dedicated to archiving presidential speeches, the data for this research is accessible, inexpensive to acquire, and easily replicated (Lee 2000). Document analysis provided an interpretive format that was well suited toward understanding how the candidates' rhetoric shaped the debate over America's response to terrorism. The campaign speeches of the President and the Senator presented an interpretive format to tease out how the candidates not only framed the debate over the nation's response to terrorism, but also the ideas that were missing from this debate. The candidates' rhetoric not only gave meaning to September the 11th, but it also reinforced American hegemony in opposition to militant Islamists.

¹² After an extensive search, this project's website proved to have the most extensive archive of President Bush's and Senator Kerry's speeches during the 2004 Campaign. It is fielded by Paul Stob, at University of Wisconsin—Madison and Martin Medhurst at Baylor University, both formerly at Texas A&M. Originally, the project was affiliated with the Program in Presidential Rhetoric at Texas A&M.

Drawing on campaign speeches to analyze how the candidates framed the debate over terrorism eliminated researcher influence (Lee 2000) upon the subjects and presented the data as the speakers intended. Examining only the President's and the Senator's public statements preserved the candidates' social constructions about terrorism as they originally presented them during the campaign. Using an unobtrusive method, like document analysis to investigate competing frames about the War on Terror increased the credibility of this study's findings.

Limitations

Although decontextualising (Lee 2000) is one of the limitations of document analysis, the candidates' public statements provided access to how President Bush and Senator Kerry framed the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror to define the dimensions of U.S. power. Another limitation of the data was considered. Professional writers drafted these speeches. The candidates' public comments may not have absolutely reflected their views on terrorism. However, both the President and the Senator made these speeches to present their views to the American public and argue over Iraq and the War on Terror in their bid for the White House. Therefore, the campaign rhetoric was attributed to the President and the Senator in this study.

The occurrence of "intervening variables" (Lee 2000) was considered. The content of speeches could have changed according to the audience and if the candidates shifted their speeches in response to media criticism of their campaign platforms. This could have presented conflicting meanings for social constructions of terrorism. For example, a speech given at a rally for candidates' known supporters could have included commentary on the War on Terror that differs from a speech given to a general national

audience. This would have made making meaningful analyses of the social construction of war problematic. To control for this error, I categorized these speeches according to the type of audience to highlight the possible differences in rhetoric and the impact of the aforementioned intervening variables. By placing a document in the context in which it was created—by addressing location, audience, and the intended purpose of the speaker—this error was minimized. In addition, it was impossible to know specifically the media’s impact upon the candidates’ campaign rhetoric without, for example, expanding this study further to track corresponding news reports on campaign issues. This was not included in the study due to limitations of time and the need to keep the research aims focused. However, I noted any general trends and any noticeable shifts in the President and Senator’s rhetoric to address this possible research error.

In addition, because of the “selective recoding” error (Lee 2000), segments of public statements that were relevant to this study may have been omitted. This would have resulted in an inaccurate portrayal of how these candidates framed the occupation of Iraq and the War on Terror. However, by triangulating the types of documents I gathered, I decreased the chances of excluding important data to this study and decreased the weakness that is inherent to “single method reliance” (Lee 2000).

Finally, Lee (2000) argues that unobtrusive measures such as document analysis have a “limited application range” and are not suitable for all areas of study (p. 8). They are, however, ideally suited to investigations of the public statements of public figures, particularly political figures. Frequently political leaders’ speeches have been studied to uncover how their rhetoric shapes the social construction of human knowledge and social phenomenon. For example, prior research has used the public statements of Pope Urban

II (1095), Queen Elizabeth I (1588), Adolf Hitler (1938), and George W. Bush (2001) to study call-to-arms texts over the last millennium (Graham et al. 2004).

Sample

Since I intentionally sampled specific public statements of two presidential candidates to reveal their perspectives on the War on Terror and U.S. power within the context of the Iraq war, I used a purposive sampling strategy to select public statements that reflected their views on the subject (Esterberg 2002). I selected speeches of the two candidates in which they framed and informed the public about the War on Terror from the time of the Democratic Convention on July 26, 2004 through November 3, 2004, the end of the campaign cycle. Of the three presidential debates between President Bush and Senator Kerry, I chose the Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate, nationally televised on September 30. Eight public statements were singled out related to Iraq and the War on Terror made by Mr. Bush in his elected office, the presidency. In addition, two public statements by Mr. Kerry were selected on the same criteria, in his elected office of Senator. The following national addresses for both candidates were picked: their nomination speeches, President Bush's acceptance speech, and Senator Kerry's concession speech. Finally, I chose rally speeches that the candidates made about the War on Terror, which included their rhetoric about Iraq (see Appendix A for Tables A1-A3). In order to manage the amount of data included in this study a random purposeful strategy was devised. I used a random number table to sample the rally speeches of both candidates to halve the original sample of these documents. Of the President's forty-five rally speeches, I sampled until I reached twenty-two documents and of the Senator's twenty-six rally speeches, thirteen rally speeches were included in the final analysis. My

final sample included fifty documents, including the debate, the candidates national speeches, the public statement they gave in their elected capacity at the time of the election, and the President's and the Senator's rally speeches (see Appendix B for Tables B1-B3).

Design

Since document analysis is an unobtrusive measure of qualitative research, it lends itself to the study of subjects who are difficult to access directly, such as political figures. In this cross-sectional study of documents, I examined President Bush's and Senator Kerry's rhetoric regarding Iraq and the War on Terror over slightly three months to capture the debate over terrorism between the only major contenders for the White House in 2004 to locate the margins of "official" debate.

Procedures

I accessed the candidates' public statements from the following public websites: 1.) www.whitehouse.gov; 2.) www.georgewbush.com; 3.) www.johnkerry.com; and 4.) www.debates.org. The first is the "official" White House web site that posts information about the current administration and its policies. The second and third sites were the nominees' web sites where policy and platforms were presented; and the last site sponsors and archives presidential debates beginning with the 1988 Debates. Since the documents that were examined are the candidates' public statements about the War in Iraq and the larger War on Terror, I was able to capture a reasonable picture of the debate between the only two legitimized competitors during the 2004 Election. Since the War on Terror was a hotly debated issue in the presidential race, both the President's and the Senator's speeches were easily accessible.

Measurement

While studying each line of the documents, the speeches were coded to identify and define initial themes that shaped the debate over terrorism and provided an explanation for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the response to these attacks, the War on Terror. Preliminary research generated the following coding index of themes that were grounded in the data: (1) retelling 9/11, (2) victimizing citizens, (3) saving citizens, (4) responding to 9/11, (5) storytelling, (6) hero-making, (7) liberating, (8) trusting in the faith and spirit of our nation, (9) proclaiming the future of America, (10) defining the President's role, (11) characterizing U.S. soldiers, (12) characterizing our allies, and (13) charactering our enemies (see Appendix C for Table C1). This coding index of themes guided research and exposed more clearly the final themes and sub-themes in the data that explained the role of 9/11 in shaping American foreign policy toward terrorism.

The final themes that guided analyses were organized into categories with primary themes and sub-themes and generated a taxonomy of the major ideas the candidates used in their rhetoric to frame the debate over terrorism and U.S. foreign policy. According to Raymond E. Lee (2000), who advanced the ideas of Eugene J. Webb's (1966) pioneering work on unobtrusive measures in the social sciences, a taxonomy can be generated to measure two dimensions of a characteristic of social phenomenon, the characteristic itself and the features of this characteristic. Measuring the characteristic in these two ways identifies and locates it within social processes that provide the basis for making inferences about how the characteristic influences social processes that construct a particular reality (Lee 2000).

I applied similar measures to the social construction of war by locating various themes and their corresponding sub-themes within the President's and the Senator's rhetoric in this study to illuminate how their public discourse framed the social construction of the Iraq War and the War on Terror to explain American power. As the research evolved, the taxonomy of main themes and sub-themes was generated by the initial coding index. The final taxonomy analyzed the candidates' rhetoric to examine their foreign policy objectives in response to terrorism; and how their response shaped the perimeters of this debate. The following is the final taxonomy of main themes and their sub-themes: (1) responding to 9/11, (1a) retelling 9/11, (1b) our enemies, (1c) our allies, (2) learning lessons from prior wars (2a) arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, (2b) arguing over previous wartime presidents, (3) contesting images of patriotism (see Chapter IV and Appendix C for Table C2). Finally, to examine further the perimeters of the debate and the marginalization of alternative frames, I looked for what these two presidential candidates did not state in their public statements on the campaign trail.

Validity and Credibility

Anton J. Kuzel (1992), a scholar in the medical sociology research field, offers in-depth instruction on how to increase the validity and credibility of data collected using a purposeful sampling strategy in qualitative methods. As Kuzel (1992) suggests, I looked for universal patterns in the data and examined whether the data I collected disputed the taxonomy of themes to increase the validity and credibility of my findings. I verified inferences made by a candidate by collecting another statement from the same speech category of the candidate to limit error in my analysis. Negative cases (Kuzel 1992) did not dispute prior analysis. Instead, all of the themes were broadened to capture

unexpected cases of both candidates' rhetoric that made meaning of Iraq, the War on Terror, and U.S. power by the debate over freedom and the democratization of Iraq and the Middle East. In addition, the major themes, learning lessons from prior wars and contesting images of patriotism were expanded to include Senator Kerry's rhetoric about the impact of the war on America's social welfare system. The lack of negative cases to dispute the final taxonomy suggests that the interpretation of the debate between the candidates is correct. In fact, the themes that were uncovered were more prevalent than expected, especially since the themes were expanded to explain the domestic consequences of the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror without losing data that explained the dominant frames the candidates used to explain American power.

Although I used a single method, document analysis, I triangulated my sources of data to increase the comprehensiveness of this method and the likelihood that negative cases would be found (Kuzel 1992). I sampled documents from various types of campaign rhetoric. The triangulated documents included in this study were the purposefully randomly sampled political rallies of both candidates, the Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate, the public statements President Bush and Senator Kerry made in their elected capacities as President and Senator, and their national addresses.

Data Analysis

In order to keep track of data amassed during this project I generated a list of the final documents for both candidates organized by type, date, and location of the speech that were investigated in this study. I saved segments of public statements copied from the above-mentioned web sites as text documents that addressed the Iraq War and the

War on Terror in the word processing program, Office 2003. A content analysis computer program, QSR*NUDIST, was used to facilitate analysis of the data.

Although I used a purposive sampling strategy to collect my data and, thus, my data collection was theory-based, I used a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) to guide the analysis of this data. Using a grounded theory approach led to a deeper understanding of how the candidates made meaning of September the 11th and how they explained America's response to terrorism. In the 1960's, sociologists Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss pioneered grounded theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argued that instead of theory guiding data analysis, data should guide theory instead. They reasoned that if the researcher was "grounded" in the data, instead of exclusively in theory-building, then making meaning of human reflection, thought, and action would steer the social researcher toward a better explanation of social phenomenon. As I immersed myself in data collection and analysis of the data, I discovered themes that generated the coding index, and eventually the final taxonomy of themes (Lee 2000). This process allowed the dominant themes to be uncovered in the candidates' rhetoric that shaped the debate over the role of the United States in its campaign to fight terrorism and simultaneously guided the theory that informed analysis. Ultimately, this led to an explanation of how the candidates' social constructions of terrorism and American hegemony framed the margins of debate and marginalized ideas that conflicted with the objectives of foreign policy makers in Washington.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

Three major themes about the nature of U.S. power and freedom characterized the candidates' rhetoric about the War on Terror. The following are the major themes grounded in the candidates' rhetoric: (1) responding to 9/11, (2) learning lessons from prior wars, and (3) contesting images of patriotism. The major themes not only guided the direction of the research, but also guided theory about how American hegemony in the War on Terror is shaped and reproduced. These major themes in turn helped me to uncover and define each of the minor sub-themes.

Responding to 9/11 was comprised of the following secondary themes: (a) retelling 9/11, (b) our enemies, and (c) our allies. These themes organized and established the perspectives of the candidates about the U.S. foreign policy response to terrorism, which shaped public understanding about terrorism.

The candidates illustrated the lessons of prior wars to connect the War on Terror to America's long tradition of defending freedom. Learning lessons from prior wars conceptualized how the candidates placed the occupation of Iraq and the War on Terror in the context of prior wars. The following two sub-themes were included in this category (a) arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, (b) arguing over previous wartime presidents.

The final dimension of campaign rhetoric was the candidates' presentations of patriotism. Contesting images of patriotism illustrated how the candidates demonstrated their moral fortitude to resolve the conflict in Iraq and to lead the nation in the War on Terror. The candidates presented particular meanings about the terrorist attacks on

September the 11th and the subsequent War on Terror by drawing upon such American ideals as freedom, liberty, democracy, and service to the nation to define the dimensions of the debate over patriotism. In particular, they highlighted the contributions of service members engaged in the Iraq War and the War on Terror.

These themes illustrate how the candidates narrowly defined the debate over America's foreign policy response to terrorism and the conflict in Iraq to the detriment of a wider public debate over the causes of and solutions to terrorism. Largely missing from the candidates' public addresses was a discussion of alternative explanations for the events of 9/11 and alternative outcomes for the contest of American supremacy in the face of terrorism. Neither candidate disputed the militarization of the foreign policy response to the attacks or the effectiveness of this method to combat terrorism. Because President Bush claimed that former President Clinton could have prevented 9/11 if he had not dealt with the World Trade Bombing in 1994 as a criminal investigation, Senator Kerry avoided suggesting this as an appropriate response. Instead, the debate was dominated by the idea of waging war when diplomacy failed. Although Senator Kerry questioned the veracity of President Bush's logic of invading Iraq to fight the War on Terror, he did not question that America's military might and world leadership were essential to the global fight against terrorism; or that the United States is entitled by its democratic birthright to guide the world in moral action against terrorism. These principles provided the foundation for both of the candidates to argue for the War on Terror.

In addition, the candidates maintained their perspectives on terrorism across audience types. The candidates both practiced message discipline and did not alter their

rhetoric on the main arguments they used to convince audiences of their fitness to lead the country in the War on Terror. This was an unexpected finding. The candidates superficially tailored their message to the audience they were addressing (for example, whether a speech was given to a group at a university or an organization like the American Legion). However, they emphasized the same points in their rhetoric as they would, whether they were giving a rally speech, a national address, or a speech in their elected capacity as President and Senator, at the time of the campaign. In order to establish themselves as legitimate candidates for the American presidency, the President and the Senator maintained their message across audiences. The candidates' practice of message discipline reinforced the observation that the debate about terrorism was limited because it was informed by American hegemony. This finding and the following analysis of the major themes clarified the manner in which the candidates debated over the meaning of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and U.S. power.

Responding to 9/11

Responding to 9/11 summarized the candidates' solutions for preventing another direct attack on American soil to confront the dangers of terrorism. The first dominant theme captured the candidates' perspectives on how the United States should be guided by its foreign policy objectives on the global stage in response to September the 11th. Although both the President and the Senator agreed Saddam Hussein was a threat, they disagreed over whether Saddam Hussein was a terrorist threat and therefore, the candidates disagreed over the manner in which the United States should have dealt with the Iraqi dictator. Since the Iraqi leader had knowledge of nuclear weapon technology that he could share with terrorists, President Bush argued that he was a threat to

national security. Therefore, according to the President, since diplomacy had failed, the only viable option left was a military intervention in Iraq to remove the dictator from power in order to safeguard American freedom at home from terrorists. Unlike President Bush, Senator Kerry did not tie Saddam Hussein to terrorists or the invasion of Iraq to protecting America and democracy from terrorism, but instead he connected the outcome of the invasion to an increased risk of terrorism for the United States and the world's nations.

Leading up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, President Bush directly linked Saddam Hussein to the Al Qaeda attack on the American mainland. However, during the 2004 campaign he held that although Saddam Hussein had not conspired directly against America with the 9/11 hijackers, Hussein's relationships with terrorist organizations were suspicious. President Bush's explanation for the invasion of Iraq focused on the Iraqi dictator's hatred of America and his potential to spread nuclear weapon technology to terrorists. At a rally for the President in New Mexico on October 11, he explained that his decision to invade Iraq was guided by his desire to protect America from threats like September the 11th from occurring again:

After September the 11th, America had to assess every potential threat in a new light. It's one of the lessons of that fateful day. We confront an even greater danger, that the prospect of terrorists getting weapons of mass destruction would inflict great harm on America. We had to take a hard look at everyplace where terrorists might get those weapons. And one regime stood out: the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. We knew his record of aggression and support for terror. We knew he hated America. We knew he had weapons of mass destruction. We know that after September the 11th, we must take threats seriously before they fully materialize.... So we gave Saddam Hussein a final chance, and he continued to deceive the world. He was deceiving the weapons inspectors. And so I have a choice to make at this time in our history: Do I forget the lessons of September the 11th and take the word of a madman, or do I take

action to defend our country? Given that choice, I will defend America every time. (117-142)

In a speech at a rally on September 20 in New York City President Bush explicitly named the terrorists that Saddam Hussein harbored in his country and again pointed to the danger the former dictator posed. According to the President, Saddam Hussein could have shared nuclear weapon technology with terrorists like Al Qaeda whose attack on September the 11th devastated the nation. Therefore, President Bush argued it was essential for the United States to have removed him from power:

He harbored terrorists. Abu Nidal was a cold-blooded terrorist killer who killed Leon Klinghoffer. Abu Nidal and his organization was [sic] in Iraq. Zarqawi, the person who likes to behead people in order to shake our will, is in Baghdad. He had a network of people in that country. Saddam Hussein paid the families of suicide bombers. Saddam Hussein possessed and used weapons of mass destruction. He was a threat. (45-52)

Senator Kerry disputed President Bush's framing of the Iraq War and that Iraq was a growing terrorist threat to the security of Americans. Instead, the Senator argued that the President's decision to invade Iraq had diverted the United States from fighting the War on Terror. In his speech on the campaign trail to veterans gathered at the 86th Annual American Legion Convention on September 1, the Senator argued that due to the President's and his administration's mismanagement of the War on Terror, terrorism had increased and that Iraq had become an epicenter for terrorist activity:

Violence has spread in Iraq; Iran has expanded its influence; and extremism has gained momentum. President Bush now admits he miscalculated in Iraq. In truth, his miscalculation was ignoring the advice that was given to him, including the best advice of America's own military.... I would have relied on American troops in Tora Bora when we had Bin Laden in our sights. I never would have diverted resources so quickly from Afghanistan before finishing the job. I would've given the inspectors the time they needed to do the job. I wouldn't have ignored my

senior military advisors. I would've made sure that every soldier put in harm's way had the equipment and body armor they needed. I would have built a strong, broad coalition of our allies around the world. And, if there's one thing I learned from my service, I would never have gone to war without a plan to win the peace. (38-51)

According to Senator Kerry, the U.S. invasion of Iraq not only derailed the nation from its efforts to eliminate Osama bin Laden, but it also put the United States at greater risk to the dangers of terrorism. In addition, although he agreed Saddam Hussein had been a threat, Kerry argued during the Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate held in Florida on September 30, that the President should have used diplomacy and not military force to remove the dictator:

I wasn't misleading when I said he was a threat. Nor was I misleading on the day that the president decided to go to war when I said that he had made a mistake in not building strong alliances and that I would have preferred that he did more diplomacy. I've had one position, one consistent position, that Saddam Hussein was a threat. There was a right way to disarm him and a wrong way. And the president chose the wrong way. (866-870)

Unlike the Senator who believed that Saddam Hussein was a threat who could have been defeated diplomatically while the nation dealt with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda militarily; the President believed that diplomatic options had failed and that the only option left was military intervention to prevent the dictator from aiding terrorists. In addition, the President believed that the War in Iraq was a successful military strategy to defend the United States and the world from terrorism to prevent another September the 11th-like attack. Ultimately, although President Bush and Senator Kerry disagreed over the nature of the threat Saddam Hussein posed, both candidates responded to 9/11 by connecting the democratization of the Middle East to U.S. security at home and abroad.

Retelling 9/11

Responding to 9/11 was elucidated further by three sub-themes: retelling 9/11, our enemies, and our allies. Both candidates linked the events of 9/11 either directly or indirectly to the War on Terror in their campaign rhetoric. For example, both commonly referred to the loss of life on September the 11th at the World Trade Center with the number 3,000 when they described the ensuing war. However, unlike President Bush, Senator Kerry did not connect the devastation of 9/11 to the Iraq War. Instead, the Senator disputed the President's analysis of the threat that Iraq had posed prior to the U.S. led invasion. Not only did the sub-theme retelling 9/11 capture the candidates' accounts of the events on 9/11, it also introduced the debate that framed the foreign policy response to 9/11.

At an "official" White House ceremony, the President proclaimed Patriot Day on September 10 to honor the innocent lives lost in the terrorist attacks on 9/11. When he made his announcement, he reminded us that the greatness of America was displayed in the character of its citizens on that day in response to the actions of those who had sought to shatter the American psyche. In the President's rhetoric, he refers only to the 3,000 people who died on 9/11 in the WTC as victims. Instead of examining the reasons that could have precipitated this attack, he illustrated how this event symbolized America's invincibility:

Three years ago, our country was ruthlessly attacked, and more than 3,000 innocent people lost their lives. We will always remember the victims: sons and daughters, husbands and wives, dads and moms, family members, co-workers, and friends. And we will always be inspired by the heroism and decency of our fellow citizens on that day. Police, firefighters, emergency rescue personnel, doctors, nurses, and many others risked their own lives to save the lives of their fellow citizens. They

demonstrated the great character and bravery of our Nation, and they embody the great spirit of America. (1-5)

He only once referred to those who perished in the attack on Pentagon. In Iowa on October 25, the President remarked to a group of his supporters only about the damage to the building, not the persons who had died. He did not personalize the lives of the victims on the planes or the lives of the workers who died in the Pentagon as he had with the victims at the WTC:

And so their plans became more ambitious, and their attacks became more deadly, until, finally, the Twin Towers became Ground Zero, and the Pentagon was in flames. (308)

Neither the Senator, nor the President described the actions of the passengers who died on United Flight 93 headed toward the White House as victims of the terrorists. In the President's televised nomination speech at the Republican National Convention held in New York City on September 2, he recounted the events of 9/11.¹³ The United Flight 93 passengers were not victims of the terrorists, like those who died in the attacks of the WTC; they were saving citizens from being attacked by sacrificing their own lives:

When I said those words four years ago, none of us could have envisioned what these years would bring. In the heart of this great city, we saw tragedy arrive on a quiet morning. We saw the bravery of rescuers grow with danger. We learned of passengers on a doomed plane who died with a courage that frightened their killers. (4-7)

¹³ To explore further how President Bush discussed the events of 9/11 in his campaign rhetoric see sentences 29-33 and 140-141 of his nomination speech at the Republican National Convention on September 2.

When the candidates made meaning of the deaths of the passengers of United Flight 93, both the President and the Senator depicted them similarly; they were portrayed as saviors and not as victims.

Three years later at the Third Massachusetts 9/11 Fund Commemoration given on September 11, the Senator similarly recalled the events of that day. The Senator presented America's opposition to terrorism by drawing on the personal experiences and histories of the passengers and the rescuers. When he referred to the attack on the Pentagon, he only acknowledged the rescuers at the Pentagon and not the individuals who had died. He used the responses of ordinary citizens to symbolize America's national character. He described how the United Flight 93 passengers protected the nation's capitol when they attempted to commandeer the plane from the terrorists. Not only did their courage stop Washington from being attacked and inspire them to cooperate with one another; their courage inspired all Americans to support one another in a similar manner, as was evidenced by the outpouring of public grief following the aftermath of 9/11:

Three years ago today, on a bright September morning, a young couple took their three year old daughter on her first airplane flight – American Flight 11, from Boston to Los Angeles. On that morning, a man from a tiny town just west of here, reported for work in the World Trade Center. He had just gotten a promotion. He had just married the love of his life. And everyone back home was so proud. On that morning, a gentle priest beloved by his parish boarded United Flight 175 to visit his sister in California. One of his parishioners later said he thought God put him on that plane to give comfort to those on board. On September 11, 2001, your loved ones and nearly 3,000 others were living out the daily rhythm of life in a nation at peace. And on that morning in a single moment, they were lost, and our world changed forever. In the hours after the attacks, we drew strength from firefighters who ran up the stairs and risked their lives so that others might live. From rescuers who rushed into smoke and fire at the Pentagon. From the men and women of Flight 93 who sacrificed themselves to save our nation's Capitol. They didn't think

twice. They didn't look back. And their courage lifted our nation. On that day, we all drew strength from each other.... So while September 11th was the worst day we have ever seen, it brought out the best in all of us. We will always remember where we were on that day. And we must always remember that we will only defeat those who sought to destroy us by standing together as one America. (3-30)

Like President Bush, Senator Kerry depersonalized the terrorists by focusing on their actions rather than reflecting on U.S. power. By failing to acknowledge that American intervention abroad was not always welcomed, the candidates were able to avoid addressing whether Al-Qaeda had intelligible reason(s) for attacking the nation and therefore, the President and the Senator set the margins of debate over U.S. foreign policy within narrow constraints.¹⁴ Both candidates employed images that aligned the actions of ordinary citizens with government foreign policy to set the margins of the debate over the meaning of the attacks. In order to illustrate the conflict between the United States and the terrorists to establish America's moral superiority, both candidates made meaning of the bravery of Americans and the sacrifices citizens had made for one another. As a result, a rigorous evaluation of the American foreign policy in the Middle East over the last several decades was absent.

Our Enemies

By describing who was responsible for 9/11 and who was a continued threat to national security, this theme clarified the candidates' foreign policy positions and the direction they would take the country to fight terrorism. In President Bush's address at

¹⁴ To further examine how Senator Kerry treated the events of 9/11 in his campaign rhetoric see sentences 14-20 of his speech at the Massachusetts 9/11 Memorial Fund and his September the 11th Democratic National Radio Address, lines 6-11.

the Republican National Convention in New York City, he stated his position on fighting terrorism. Since the enemy feared freedom, he illustrated how advancing freedom in the Middle East was essential to defeating the terrorists. It was essential to democratize Iraq in order to disavow the power of radical Islam and protect liberty:

Others understand the historic importance of our work. The terrorists know. They know that a vibrant, successful democracy at the heart of the Middle East will discredit their radical ideology of hate. They know that men and women with hope, and purpose, and dignity do not strap bombs on their bodies and kill the innocent. The terrorists are fighting freedom with all their cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest fear and they should be afraid, because freedom is on the march. (100-104)

Not only did the President elaborate on the brutality of terrorists, he emphasized the viciousness of Saddam Hussein, whom he had continually associated with Al Qaeda throughout his campaign rhetoric. In his speech to a crowd in Ohio on October 22, he shared an account about the pettiness of the dictator:

One of the most poignant stories of my presidency was when the Oval Office door opened and in came seven men from Iraq, all of whom had had their right hand cut off by Saddam Hussein because the currency of that country had devalued and he needed scapegoats. It's a true story, I'm telling you. And I asked one of the men there. I said, why you? He said he was a small merchant who needed gold to make jewelry, and he sold dinars to buy another currency so he could buy the gold, and it just happened to be on the day that Saddam was looking for a scapegoat. He found seven small merchants, seven individuals, [sic] hauled in, Xs carved in their foreheads, and their right hands cut off. (72-77)

The demonization of Saddam Hussein was common throughout the President's campaign. When he elaborated on the threat that organizations and individuals linked to terrorism posed to democracy, he always defended his actions by relating the horrific dehumanization of Iraq's citizens under Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule.

The Senator made comparable references to the enemy. Like the President, he did not question whether the United States should isolate radical Islamists and liberate the

Middle East from their influence. Instead, the Senator disputed the validity of the President's claim that Saddam Hussein was a terrorist threat, but shared the President's perspective about the ruthlessness that had characterized Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. At Temple University on September 24, the Senator compared the current conflict with terrorism to the threat Communism posed to freedom during the Cold War and demonstrated the difference between freedom's enemies:

I begin with this belief: The war on terror is as monumental a struggle as the Cold War. Its outcome will determine whether we and our children live in freedom or in fear. It is not, as some people think, a clash of civilizations. Radical Islamic fundamentalism is not the true face of Islam. This is a clash between civilization and the enemies of civilization; between humanity's best hopes and most primitive fears.... The invasion of Iraq was a profound diversion from the battle against our greatest enemy – Al Qaeda – which killed more than three thousand people on 9/11 and which still plots our destruction today. Iraq is now what it was not before the war – a haven for terrorists. George Bush made Saddam Hussein the priority. I would have made Osama bin Laden the priority. As president, I will finish the job in Iraq and refocus our energies on the real war on terror. (43-70)

Senator Kerry ranked Al Qaeda as the greatest enemy that the United States faced. Like the former Communist U.S.S.R., Al Qaeda had the ability and the tenacity to destroy America. For the Senator, Osama bin Laden was the furthestmost danger to America and democracy, not Saddam Hussein. Both of the candidates compared past U.S. enemies to Al Qaeda. Like the Communists, the terrorists were relentless in their crusade to spread their ideology throughout the Middle East in order to usurp the West's power and influence over the world. In the candidates' rhetoric, like the Cold War, the War on Terror was an epic battle that would decide the future of freedom.

Our Allies

Since for both candidates the War on Terror was a war that must be won, one of the major strategies that would predict a successful outcome for the United States was the

way in which America handled its alliances with foreign countries. Following the Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate on September 30, the President addressed the Senator's criticism of his alliance building to fight the War on Terror in Iraq. President Bush defended his record of diplomatic leadership and the nations that supported America's global fight against terror abroad to supporters in Iowa on October 25:

We have stated clearly the challenge to civilization, and we have rallied many nations to oppose it. More than 90 nations are actively engaged in the war on terror. All 26 NATO nations have personnel in either Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. NATO has taken leadership of an international force in Afghanistan, the first out-of-area deployment in the history of our alliance. Japan has deployed forces to Iraq, the first overseas mission in the history of their democracy. Forces from South Korea are in Iraq, as well. America has led, many have joined, and America and the world are safer. My opponent takes a different approach. He believes that instead of leading with confidence, America must submit to what he calls a global test. I'm not making that up. He was standing right about just [sic] there when I heard him say it. As far as I can tell – as far as I can tell, that means our country must get permission from foreign capitals before we act in our own self-defense. As President, I will always work with other countries and seek their advice. But there is a world of difference between working with good allies and giving a few reluctant nations veto power over our role in the world. I will never submit our national security decisions to the veto of a foreign government. (89-103)

President Bush questioned Senator Kerry's ability to protect America from the continued threat of terrorism using the Senator's concept of the "global test." He questioned the legitimacy of the Senator's foreign policy position of building alliances. The President disputed whether the Senator, if elected President, would prioritize the national security needs of the United States over global interests.

During the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy Debate in Florida on September 30, Jim Lehrer, the moderator, asked Senator Kerry what his position was on

pre-emptive war. The Senator replied and defended the “global test” against the President’s criticism that was ongoing throughout the campaign:

The president always has the right, and always has had the right, [sic] for pre-emptive strike. That was a great doctrine throughout the Cold War. And it was always one of the things we argued about with respect to arms control. No president, through all of American history, has ever ceded, and nor would I, the right to preempt in any way necessary to protect the United States of America. But if and when you do it, Jim, you have to do it in a way that passes the test, that passes the global test where your countrymen, your people understand fully why you're doing what you're doing and you can prove to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons. (771-775)

The Senator did not argue over the right of the President of the United States to execute a pre-emptive strike against any nation or organization that threatens the national security of the United States. The Senator diverged from the President on how the United States should proceed to execute a pre-emptive strike. He questioned the veracity of the claims the administration made at the U.N. about the threat Iraq posed and the rest of the nations the U.S. claimed as its allies in the War on Terror. Senator Kerry’s strategy of performing a global test prior to military intervention was a thinly veiled criticism against President Bush’s and his administration’s procedural tactics leading to the invasion of Iraq.

Learning Lessons from Prior Wars

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 that struck the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the hijacked plane that never hit its intended target—Washington, D.C. — marked a defining moment in U.S. history. The shock that these violent acts delivered to the heart of the nation was reflected in the campaign rhetoric of President Bush and Senator Kerry when they compared the War on Terror to other wars the nation had fought. The candidates compared prior wars to the present War on Terror to emphasize

America's long tradition of leadership in foreign affairs and the nation's effectiveness at combating threats to freedom.

Learning lessons from prior wars examined how the candidates used the historical role of U.S. military might in world affairs to explain their interpretation of the America's response to terrorism. In particular, they compared 9/11 to other extraordinary events in the nation's history, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; and they compared America's response then, WWII, to America's response now, the War on Terror.

At one of the President's rally speeches on October 11 in New Mexico, he outlined the similarities between WWII and the liberation of Iraq from terrorism. In order to predict the outcome of the War on Terror and the future of American power abroad, he linked America's past WWII conflict with the Japanese to the present conflict with Iraq:

I believe in the transformational power of liberty..... You see, it wasn't all that long ago that we were fighting the Japanese.... And after we won, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, believed in the power of liberty to transform societies. And he worked with the Japanese to help them develop a democracy.... There was a lot of pessimism after World War II.... The Japanese were the enemy.... We had defeated them. A lot of people here's [sic] lives had been turned upside-down because a loved-one's life had been lost, and they didn't have – [sic] want to have anything to do with the enemy. But fortunately, there were people in this country who had the faith in the ability of liberty to transform societies. And so now I sit down at the table with Prime Minister Koizumi talking about the peace, talking about how to achieve the peace we want for our children and grandchildren. I believe the same lessons apply for today. We will achieve a free Iraq. Iraq will be a democracy. And when we do so, at some point in time, an American President and a duly-elected leader of Iraq will be sitting down talking about how to keep the peace. And our children and grandchildren will be able to live in a better world. (171-193)

According to the President, just as the Japanese had become our allies at the end of WWII, once the Iraqis embraced democracy, they also would become our allies in the War on Terror. Although the Senator compared the scope of the new war America was undertaking to WWII, he chose other elements than the President did to illustrate America's ability to advance liberty. According to Senator Kerry, President Bush's mishandling of the conflict in Iraq had damaged America's reputation. The Senator advanced the lessons of WWII to demonstrate the need to not only restore America's reputation, but to push the nation toward the vanguard of innovation. He compared his strategy to fight the War on Terror to the domestic and foreign policies of WWII that had elevated America's reputation¹⁵ and had brought technological advances that raised the living standards of its citizens. Senator Kerry addressed the tradition of American innovation and progress that had occurred during WWII to a crowded rally in New Mexico on October 11. He illustrated that the Iraq War was not similarly leading to advancements in energy development; but instead exemplified the perils of continued U.S. foreign oil dependency:

In the summer of 1942, with the scars of Pearl Harbor still fresh, Americans were gearing up for battle. Yes, planes and tanks had to be built at a record pace, strategies conceived, battles planned, and young Americans dispatched to frontlines around the globe. But Franklin Roosevelt knew that we needed something more. He knew we had to marshal America's most brilliant minds and best technology.... When they went to war, this Administration's energy experts projected that oil would be as low as \$28 a barrel today. Last week, gas prices hit a record \$53 a barrel - and one big reason is because of this president's gross mismanagement of the war in Iraq. As president, I have a real energy plan

¹⁵ See his nomination speech at the Democratic Convention, sentences 19-28, for an illustration of America's moral stewardship of freedom after WWII in West and East Germany.

to harness the full force of America's technology and make this nation independent of Middle East oil in ten years.... I want an America that relies on its own ingenuity and innovation, not the Saudi Royal family. So much promise stretches before us. America needs to climb the next mountain, look to the next horizon, and ask: What if? For the sake of our children...for the sake of our security ... for the sake of our economy ... for the sake of our environment ... we must meet that challenge and make America energy independent of Mideast oil. (6-29)

The President's war policy in Iraq symbolized the failed domestic and foreign policies for the Senator. Unlike WWII, the Iraq War and the War on Terror did not lead to the development of new technology nor expand the labor market.

The major theme, learning lessons from prior wars, captured the candidates' differing interpretations of WWII. The candidates contrasted their foreign policy objectives to fight terrorism with one another by disputing the goals and outcomes of WWII. The President emphasized the success with which Truman had democratized Japan in order to make peace with a former enemy. Similarly, he believed Iraq needed to become a democracy in order to prevent global terrorism and stabilize the Middle East. The Senator did not draw this analogy between this past war and the current War on Terror. Instead, he used it as an object lesson to demonstrate the failings of the President's strategy to fight the War on Terror. Unlike the War on Terror, WWII had raised America in the eyes of the global community to become a moral leader and had advanced technology for the betterment of the nation.

Arguing Over the Vietnam Syndrome

The candidates argued about the success of the President's strategy to democratize Iraq. The President's foreign policy mandated that before the troops returned home Iraq must assume responsibility for the protection of its fledgling democracy from terrorists and by default defend democracy for the United States and

Israel as well. Many of the President's arguments eerily echoed those of his Texas predecessor in the White House, Lyndon Baines Johnson, as he had struggled in vain to convince Americans that U.S. troop involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1960s was vital to defeating Communism and was the will of the South Vietnamese people. The President argued America would be safe from the threat of terrorism only when Iraqis became allies of America and freedom. In the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy Debate, the President outlined his plan for victory in Iraq when he responded to Jim Lehrer's question about establishing a timeline for troop deployment from Iraq:

We'll never succeed in Iraq if the Iraqi citizens do not want to take matters into their own hands to protect themselves. I believe they want to. Prime Minister Allawi believes they want to. And so the best indication about when we can bring our troops home – which I really want to do, but I don't want to do so for the sake of bringing them home; I want to do so because we've achieved an objective – [sic] is to see the Iraqis perform and to see the Iraqis step up and take responsibility.... A free Iraq will be an ally in the war on terror, and that's [sic] essential. A free Iraq will set a powerful example in the part of the world that is desperate for freedom. A free Iraq will help secure Israel. A free Iraq will enforce the hopes and aspirations of the reformers in places like Iran. A free Iraq is essential for the security of this country. (286-303)

Instead of agreeing with the President, the Senator viewed the military conflict in Iraq as not only a diversion from the 'real' War on Terror, but as an unnecessary war in which a failing policy was risking American lives. He saw the President's policy of liberation resulting in an occupation of a country whose residents bitterly resented the presence of the U.S. military, just as he had witnessed in Vietnam as a young soldier. Many Vietnamese blamed the Americans for the conflict ravaging their nation.

Due to President Bush's lack of diplomacy and overwhelming reliance on military force to liberate the Iraqi people, Senator Kerry perceived the administration's policy as an unsuccessful attempt at nation building that risked the safety of American soldiers and

their morale.¹⁶ Earlier in the debate, Jim Lehrer had asked the Senator what misjudgments he thought the President had made in Iraq. In response, Senator Kerry questioned the veracity of President Bush's claim that Iraq was the central to the War on Terror and thus necessitated military force:

Well, where do you want me to begin? First of all, he made the misjudgment of saying to America that he was going to build a true alliance, that he would exhaust the remedies of the United Nations and go through the inspections.... He also promised America that he would go to war as a last resort. Those words mean something to me, as somebody who has been in combat. "Last resort." You've got to be able to look in the eyes of families and say to those parents, "I tried to do everything in my power to prevent the loss of your son and daughter." I don't believe the United States did that. And we pushed our allies aside. And so, today, we are 90 percent of the casualties and 90 percent of the cost: \$200 billion – \$200 billion that could have been used for health care, for schools, for construction, for prescription drugs for seniors, and it's in Iraq. And Iraq is not even the center of the focus of the war on terror. The center is Afghanistan, where, incidentally, there were more Americans killed last year than the year before...where the elections have been postponed three times. (105-119)

Senator Kerry drew on his own experience as a soldier in Vietnam to explain that he viewed President Bush's failure to go to war as a "last resort," as the ultimate error of the President's foreign policy on terrorism. The Senator believed that the breakdown of diplomacy between the United States and the U.N. and the failure of the President to work more extensively with U.S. allies had caused the President to act injudiciously and ask for the ultimate sacrifice of American military families, their children. In addition, the Senator argued that the President was diverting resources away from Afghanistan at

¹⁶ To further examine the Senator's position on the Iraq War and troop support see sentences 307-325 of the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy Debate.

not only the cost of U.S. service people's lives in Iraq, but to the fiscal detriment of the next generation and the elderly.

In his response to Senator Kerry's assessment, President Bush pointed out that the Senator had access to the same foreign intelligence about Saddam Hussein's ability to produce nuclear weapons, and the Senator had come to the same conclusion as the President had when he voted with Congress to authorize the President to use force in Iraq. In addition, the President stated that his decision to invade Iraq was supported by the United Nations.¹⁷ The President further explained that terrorism had spread beyond the borders of Afghanistan and it was essential to have the presence of a U.S. military operation in Iraq to fight the war effectively:

But to say that there's only one focus on the war on terror doesn't really understand the nature of the war on terror. Of course we're after Saddam Hussein – I mean bin Laden. He's isolated. Seventy-five percent of his people have been brought to justice. The killer – the mastermind of the September 11th attacks, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, is in prison. We're making progress. But the front on this war is more than just one place....
(155-161)

However, Senator Kerry had since shifted his interpretation of the War on Terror. When it was revealed that Iraq was not a nuclear threat prior to the invasion, he pointed out that not only was the President's plan to go to war with Iraq ill conceived, but the President had also failed to prepare service members for their duties in the conflict:

The president just talked about Iraq as a center of the war on terror. Iraq was not even close to the center of the war on terror before the president invaded it.... You don't take America to war unless [sic] have the plan to win the peace. You don't send troops to war without the body armor that they need. I've met kids in Ohio, parents in Wisconsin places, Iowa, where they're going out on the Internet to get the state-of-the-art body gear to send to their kids. Some of them got them for a birthday present. I

¹⁷ See sentences 124-146 of the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy Debate for this discussion.

think that's wrong. Humvees – 10,000 out of 12,000 Humvees that are over there aren't armored. And you go visit some of those kids in the hospitals today who were maimed because they don't have the armament. This president just – I don't know if he sees what's really happening over there. But it's getting worse by the day. More soldiers killed in June than before. More in July than June. More in August than July. More in September than in August. (181-197)

The President responded to the Senator's claim that he took the nation to war without a plan to secure Iraq by questioning the Senator's ability to unite the troops in victory when he initially had been ambivalent about funding the mission in Iraq. The President's arguments revived charges of die-hard supporters of the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam that Congress's wavering support had demoralized the American troops and had hamstrung their efforts to win that conflict.¹⁸ President Bush stated:

My opponent says help is on the way, but what kind of message does it say to our troops in harm's way, "wrong war, wrong place, wrong time?" Not a message a commander in chief gives, or this is a "great diversion." As well, help is on the way, but it's certainly hard to tell it when he voted against the \$87-billion supplemental to provide equipment for our troops, and then said he actually did vote for it before he voted against it. Not what a commander in chief does when you're [sic] trying to lead troops. (332-335)

Senator Kerry responded to President Bush's criticism by reminding the audience that he was standing up for what was right, just as he did when he came back for Vietnam.

Unlike President Johnson who ultimately resigned because of the failure of U.S. leadership to stabilize Vietnam, the Senator argued that an effective leader needed to

¹⁸ See Joseph Fry's discussion in *Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings* and Terry Dietz's analysis in *Republicans and Vietnam, 1961-1968* for an in-depth examination of the debate over U.S. funding and troop morale during the Vietnam War.

admit and correct mistakes in order to provide a response that was sufficient to combat terrorism:

Well, you know, when I talked about the \$87 billion, I made a mistake in how I talk about the war. But the president made a mistake in invading Iraq. Which is worse? I believe that when you know something's going wrong, you make it right. That's what I learned in Vietnam. When I came back from that war I saw that it was wrong. Some people don't like the fact that I stood up to say no, but I did. And that's what I did with that vote. And I'm going to lead those troops to victory. (336-344)

Jim Lehrer then asked Senator Kerry about his testimony in 1971 at a congressional investigation of the Vietnam War. He quoted the Senator who had said in 1971: "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?" He then asked if, "...Americans [are] now dying in Iraq for a mistake?" As he analyzed the decisions that led to a war in Iraq, the Senator responded that the lessons he had learned from fighting in Vietnam made him a cautious leader, who would not go to war unless it was absolutely necessary:

No, and they don't have to, providing we have the leadership that we put – that I'm offering [sic]. I believe that we have to win this. The president and I have always agreed on that. And from the beginning, I did vote to give the authority, because I thought Saddam Hussein was a threat, and I did accept that intelligence. But I also laid out a very strict series of things we needed to do in order to proceed from a position of strength. Then the president, in fact, promised them...he said, "We will plan carefully. We will proceed cautiously. We will not make war inevitable. We will go with our allies." He didn't do any of those things. They didn't do the planning. They left the planning of the State Department in the State Department desks. They avoided even the advice of their own general. General Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, said you're going to need several hundred thousand troops. Instead of listening to him, they retired him.... And what we need now is a president who understands how to bring these other countries together to recognize their stakes in this. (349-366)

The President retorted that the Senator lacked the credibility to lead our allies if he believed that the Iraq War was a “grand diversion.” The Senator had equivocated too often on his decision to provide funding for the conflict to make his arguments credible and thus the Senator lacked the ability to strengthen our alliances and engage the respect of world leaders and forces on the ground:

You can't [sic] expect to build an alliance when you denigrate the contributions of those who are serving side by side with American troops in Iraq. Plus, he says the cornerstone of his plan to succeed in Iraq is to call upon nations to serve. So what's the message going to be: "Please join us in Iraq. We're a grand diversion. Join us for a war that is the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time?" (386-390)

The major disagreement about the strategy to fight the War on Terror between the two candidates revolved around whether fighting the Iraq War was essential to the War on Terror or whether the Iraq War was a diversion from the ‘real’ War on Terror. From this disagreement over the Iraq War stemmed all other differences of opinion between the candidates. The President viewed the Iraq War as a path to defending democracy from terrorism and a way to avoid another direct hit on American soil. The Senator viewed the conflict as an increasing threat to the stability of the Middle East and American foreign policy, as well as a threat to domestic policy. He argued that due to the President's strategy to fight the War on Terror, the democratization of Iraq was impossible if the Iraqis viewed U.S. forces as occupiers. President Bush viewed his steadfastness in pursuing victory in Iraq as essential to refuting the charge that Vietnam had proven that the United States could be defeated if their enemy could drag out the conflict until the American public's will flagged. In contrast, Kerry argued that Vietnam should have taught the nation's foreign policy leaders to choose their battlefields more wisely and avoid ideologically ambiguous commitments of American military strength.

Arguing Over Previous Wartime Presidents

The President compared the Senator to past Presidents from the Democratic Party and the Republican Party to dismiss his opponent's policies. The Senator countered by contrasting the President's strategies to fight terrorism to not only previous President's from both parties, but the current President's father as well, George H.W. Bush.

Bush reviewed Senator Kerry's record of opposition to former Presidents' foreign policy decisions on the Middle East, the Cold War, and military expenditures. He questioned the Senator's loyalty to the values and goals symbolized by noteworthy Democratic leaders. For example, at a rally held in Ohio on October 27 the President presented the Senator's betrayal of the principles, which guided former Presidents from the Democratic Party during wartime:

When Ronald Reagan was confronting the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, Senator Kerry said that President Reagan's policy of peace through strength was making America less safe. History has shown that Senator Kerry was wrong and President Ronald Reagan was right. When former President Bush led a coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991, Senator Kerry voted against the use of forces to liberate Kuwait. History has shown that Senator Kerry was wrong and former President Bush was right.... During the last 20 years, in key moments of challenge and decision for America, Senator Kerry has chosen the position of weakness and inaction. With that record, he stands in opposition not just to me, but to the great tradition of the Democratic Party. The party of Franklin Roosevelt, the party of Harry Truman, the party of John Kennedy is rightly remembered for confidence and resolve in times of war and hours of crisis. Senator Kerry has turned his back on "pay any price" and "bear any burden," and he has replaced those commitments with "wait and see," and "cut and run." (103-112)

The President illustrated why the Senator was the wrong candidate to guide America toward national security by listing the failings of the Senator's congressional record.

In order to highlight the differences between his and the President's foreign policy approaches to terrorism, the Senator also placed U.S. alliance building in Iraq in the

context of other conflicts fought by previous Presidents during the Cold War.¹⁹ On a campaign stop before a group of supporters at Temple University on September 24, Senator Kerry compared his opponent's inability to build alliances to the first President Bush's successful coalition building during the Gulf War, as well as President Clinton's achievement in leading NATO forces to manage the fall-out from the Soviet collapse in Eastern Europe:

The first President Bush waged the first Gulf War with a real coalition that fought with us on the battlefield and paid virtually the entire cost of that war. President Clinton built a real coalition in Kosovo, and now virtually every soldier on patrol there comes from a foreign country. During the Cold War, every American president understood what is still true today: The strength of our country is vital but so is the character of our country. It is better to be an America that rallies others to our cause than an America that has to go it alone. (208-211)

During the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy debate, Senator Kerry illustrated how the President's pre-emptive war strategy had decreased U.S. credibility with world leaders and as a result made American leadership precarious. He explained that President Kennedy was able to quickly avert a nuclear confrontation with the U.S.S.R. during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 because the United States was held in high regard abroad:

I mean, we can remember when President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis sent his secretary of state to Paris to meet with DeGaulle. And in the middle of the discussion, to tell them about the missiles in Cuba, he said, "Here, let me show you the photos." And DeGaulle waved them off and said, "No, no, no, no. The word of the president of the United States is good enough for me." How many leaders in the world today would respond to us, as a result of what we've done, in that way? So what is at test here is the credibility of the United States of America and how we lead the world. (777-782)

¹⁹ See sentence ten of the rally speech the Senator gave to a crowd in Ohio on October, 21st.

The Senator hinted but did not state clearly that unreliable intelligence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had expedited a legally dubious invasion of Iraq, and thus the President's actions had not only tarnished the U.S. image abroad, but it had strained relations with our allies.

Since the candidates compared their strategies to fight the War on Terror by placing these in the context of noteworthy former Presidents' foreign policy decisions, they were able to define the dimensions of debate over not only the current war but the meaning of past wars. Learning from previous wartime presidents lent clarity to the ways in which American moral authority is established. The historical role of previous wars, such as WWII, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War, as well as former wartime presidents, helped the candidates to argue that they had the character that was needed to lead the nation. Using war to demonstrate American supremacy abroad was an effective mechanism for the President and the Senator to define their candidacy and to shape the margins of debate around the moral certitude with which America conducts itself during wartime.

Contesting Images of Patriotism

Contesting images of patriotism demonstrated the underlying values that guided the candidates' responses to the attack of 9/11 and the consequences for the meaning of patriotism. Questions of patriotism surfaced as the candidates presented their plans to fight the War on Terror, discussed foreign policy in the Middle East, and set their agendas for domestic policy. As each candidate presented his platform, the basic principles of democracy provided the context to evaluate images of patriotism that

granted America the moral authority to lead the world in the War on Terror.²⁰ At the Republican National Convention on September 2 in New York City, the President illustrated the reasons the United States was ideally situated to lead the War on Terror and liberate the Middle East, as well as sustain liberty at home:

I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom. As the citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq seize the moment, their example will send a message of hope throughout a vital region. Palestinians will hear the message that democracy and reform are within their reach, and so is peace with our good friend Israel. Young women across the Middle East will hear the message that their day of equality and justice is coming. Young men will hear the message that national progress and dignity are found in liberty, not tyranny and terror. Reformers, and political prisoners, and exiles will hear the message that their dream of freedom cannot be denied forever. And as freedom advances heart by heart, and nation by nation America will be more secure and the world more peaceful..... The progress we and our friends and allies seek in the broader Middle East will not come easily, or all at once. Yet Americans, of all people, should never be surprised by the power of liberty to transform lives and nations. That power brought settlers on perilous journeys, inspired colonies to rebellion, ended the sin of slavery, and set our Nation against the tyrannies of the 20th century.... I believe that America is called to lead the cause of freedom in a new century. I believe that millions in the Middle East plead in silence for their liberty. I believe that given the chance, they will embrace the most honorable form of government ever devised by man. I believe all these things because freedom is not America's gift to the world, it is the Almighty God's gift to every man and woman in this world. (103-128)

The effect of the strategies to fight the war upon the nation's international reputation and the meaning of patriotism remained contentious between the two candidates. In Senator Kerry's opening speech of his campaign, the nomination speech at the Democratic Convention in Boston on July 29, he defined the meaning of patriotism in

²⁰ To explore further the President's presentations of patriotism see sentences 14 -26 and 145-153 from his nomination speech at the Republican National Convention.

an effort to undermine the margins of debate the President's and his administration's response to 9/11 had created.²¹ He reasoned that the President's narrow meaning of patriotism following 9/11 and throughout his presidency created political division within America and between America and the world. Although the Senator broadened the acceptable debate on the meaning of patriotism, the margins of the debate remained centered around a discussion of values over the right use of U.S. power abroad. It was assumed, by both candidates, that the United States was the only nation that could guide world affairs and therefore, it should provide the benchmark for moral action in international conflicts:

And tonight, we have an important message for those who question the patriotism of Americans who offer a better direction for our country. Before wrapping themselves in the flag and shutting their eyes and ears to the truth, they should remember what America is really all about. They should remember the great idea of freedom for which so many have given their lives. Our purpose now is to reclaim democracy itself. We are here to affirm that when Americans stand up and speak their minds and say America can do better, that is not a challenge to patriotism; it is the heart and soul of patriotism. You see that flag up there. We call her Old Glory. The stars and stripes forever. I fought under that flag, as did so many of you here and all across our country. That flag flew from the gun turret right behind my head. It was shot through and through and tattered, but it never ceased to wave in the wind. It draped the caskets of men I served with and friends I grew up with. For us, that flag is the most powerful symbol of who we are and what we believe in. Our strength. Our diversity. Our love of country. All that makes America both great and good. That flag doesn't [sic] belong to any president. It doesn't belong to any ideology and it doesn't [sic] belong to any political party. It belongs to all the American people.... You don't value families if you force them to take up a collection to buy body armor for a son or daughter in the service, if you deny veterans health care, or if you tell middle class families to wait for a tax cut, so that the wealthiest among us can get even

²¹ For another illustration of Senator's Kerry's response to the President's foreign policies see the rally speech "A New Course for America," he gave on September 2 in Ohio, sentences 17-28.

more. We believe in the value of doing what's right for everyone in the American family.... We believe that what matters most is not narrow appeals masquerading as values, but the shared values that show the true face of America.... Family and faith. Hard work and responsibility.... I don't want to claim that God is on our side. As Abraham Lincoln told us, I want to pray humbly that we are on God's side. And whatever our faith, one belief should bind us all: The measure of our character is our willingness to give of ourselves for others and for our country.... They're American values. We believe in them. They're who we are. And if we honor them, if we believe in ourselves, we can build an America that's stronger at home and respected in the world. (126-190)

Senator Kerry contested the values that the President had projected abroad in the fight against terrorism; and he used this as an opportunity to illustrate the need to restore the values that America had once truly upheld to safeguard freedom to demonstrate his interpretation of patriotism. Ironically, however, this idea was the foundation for both candidates' arguments about the necessity of U.S. leadership on the global stage to combat terrorism. Although President Bush and Senator Kerry disagreed over the values that built moral fortitude for national character, neither candidate disputed that the United States is entitled to lead the War on Terror.

The President maintained that the War on Terror was waged to protect Americans and to help Iraqis establish a democracy.²² At the President's press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi on September 23, he pledged America's continued support for Iraq and acknowledged the strides that the Prime Minister and the Iraqi people had made toward democracy:

Iraqis and their leaders are engaged in a great and historic enterprise to establish a new democracy at the heart of a vital region. As friends of

²² To see more illustrations of the President's view of the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq see sentences 50-55 and 75-82 of the President's press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi.

liberty, the new leaders of Iraq are friends of America, and all civilized nations. As enemies of tyranny and terror, the people of Iraq...have been the target of acts of violence. The enemies of freedom are using suicide bombing, beheadings, and other horrific acts to try to block progress...but we'll never be intimidated. And freedom is winning. Mr. Prime Minister, America will stand with you until freedom and justice have prevailed. America's security and Iraq's future depend on it. The Iraqi people are showing great courage and great determination... The path to our safety and to Iraq's future as a democratic nation lies in the resolute defense of freedom. If we stop fighting the terrorists in Iraq, they would be free to plot and plan attacks elsewhere, in America and other free nations. To retreat now would betray our mission, our word, and our friends. Mr. Prime Minister, America will keep its commitments. (8-22)

The President believed that the liberation of Iraq would encourage the world to denounce radical Islam and terrorism, while Senator Kerry argued that the United States was no longer the ideal that inspires others. American idealism has been one of the nation's most enduring accomplishments and has been a common staple in American thought. Senator Kerry drew upon this ideal to discuss his strategy to fight terrorism with his supporters at Temple University on September 24:

For al Qaeda, this war is a struggle for the heart and soul of the Muslim world. We will win this war only if the terrorists lose that struggle... We will win when they once again see America as the champion, not the enemy, of their legitimate yearning to live in just and peaceful societies.... The world knows the difference between empty promises and genuine commitment. So we will win when we show that America uses its economic power for the common good, doing our share to defeat the abject poverty, hunger, and disease that destroy lives and create failed states in every part of the world. We will win when we work with our allies, to enable children in poor countries to get a quality basic education. ... The future is a race between schools that spark learning and schools that teach hate. We have to preempt the haters. We have to win the war of ideas. New generations must believe there is more to life than salvation through martyrdom.... I know that it will be a long and difficult struggle. I know we have to be resolute in confronting the evil that exists in the world. But in the end, one of our greatest strengths, one of our greatest safeguards, is that America can be the ideal that inspires others everywhere. If we again become that beacon of hope, we will discover in ourselves the most powerful and useful weapons in the war against the

terrorists. Because if we are true to ourselves, terrorists cannot defeat the values and vision that have made America great. (165-220)

For a successful culmination to the hostilities between the West and the Muslim world, Senator Kerry believed not only must America export its democratic ideals it must again restore them at home in order to be an effective architect of democracy to defeat terrorism. The Senator argued that the decision to invade Iraq and the President's execution of the War on Terror eroded the hope that America represented to oppressed peoples. It was essential to re-establish America's moral authority in order for the United States to continue to lead the battle against terrorism not only on the stage of public opinion but also on the ground in Iraq and the broader Middle East.

The candidates campaigned for service members and their families and assured them that they would receive the honor and support they deserved from America. For the President, the troops and their loved ones deserved respect and admiration as they supported America's effort to defend freedom abroad and at home.²³ At a rally in Florida on October 23, the President stated that American soldiers have demonstrated what the United States has achieved with its military strength in Iraq for world peace and democracy. Unlike the Senator whose voting record on funding for the war was less than reliable, the President stressed that troops would continue to receive support for their missions if he was re-elected president:

²³ For further examples of the President's depiction of U.S. service members see sentences 131-142 of his nomination speech at the Republican National Convention and his rally speech in Iowa on October 25, "Whether Polls Up or Down I'll Always Support Military."

I want to thank those who wear the uniform who are here today. Thank you for your service. I want to thank the veterans who are here for having set such a great example for those who wear the uniform. I want to thank the military families who are here. And I assure you, we will continue to support our troops in harm's way. That is why I went to the United States Congress and proposed \$87 billion in supplemental funding, to make sure our troops had that which they need to complete their missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We received great bipartisan support for that funding. As you gather the [sic] vote, I want you to remind your friends and neighbors of this startling statistic: Only four members of the United States Senate, four out of a hundred, voted to authorize the use of force and then voted against providing the funding necessary to supporting our troops in harm's way. And two of those four were my opponent and his running mate. So they asked him, why did you make the vote? And you might remember the most famous quote of the 2004 campaign, I actually did vote for the \$87 billion right before I voted against it. They kept pressing him and he finally said the whole thing was a complicated matter. There is nothing complicated about supporting our troops in combat. (67-79)

Senator Kerry replied that not only did he promise to support the troops while they were in combat, but he also would support their dreams when they returned home. He referred directly back to the opportunities that were not forwarded to the soldiers of Vietnam when they returned home to illustrate the need to provide these opportunities to veterans of the current conflict.²⁴ At the 86th Annual American Legion Convention on September 1, the Senator emphasized that the American dream must be restored for all the nation's citizens, and especially for the citizen-soldiers who have defended the nation's freedom in Iraq and the broader Middle East:

You know that the pledge we took to defend America is also a pledge to protect the promise America offers. And let there be no doubt – when I

²⁴ For another example of the Senator, emphasizing his ability to unite the nation based on his military service in Vietnam see sentences 58-61 and 191-196 of his nomination speech at the Democratic Convention.

am president, you will have a fellow veteran in the White House who understands that those who fought for our country abroad should never have to fight for what they were promised at home.... I also want to speak directly for a moment to those currently risking their lives as faraway as Iraq and Afghanistan. America's prayers are with you. We honor your service, thank you for your sacrifice and we pledge to stand with your families as you stand for ours.... I want to speak today about one other great challenge. When the troops who are fighting for us over there come home, we owe them an America where they can plan a future and get a job that lets them get ahead – an America where military families are part of a growing middle-class, not struggling to join it.... My friends, I believe that the full duty of the Commander-in-Chief is to lead an America where the benefits of American life are available to all who risked their lives defending it.... Our citizen soldiers are hardworking, middle-class Americans who live by real American values: faith and family, service and sacrifice, responsibility and hard work. They need jobs, health care, and a good education to live those values.... For our soldiers, for their families, and all those hardworking Americans looking to build a better life, we must pursue a path that once again places the American Dream within reach of every American citizen. (4-87)

Senator Kerry confirmed that supporting the troops abroad was important; and it was equally important to compensate them for their service by providing them with the benefits of an America that they had fought to protect. Where as President Bush declared that once hostilities in Iraq ended the troops would come home with the honor and respect they deserve, the President did not lay out a plan comparable to the Senator's to repay the debt the nation owed them for defending Americans' freedom abroad. Although the candidates' strategies differed on the ways to assist the nation's military and their families, they agreed that funding the troops in combat should continue and neither called for an immediate troop withdrawal from Iraq.

The President and the Senator defined presidential leadership by determining American values and employing the meaning of these values to facilitate presentations of their strategies to conclude the war in Iraq successfully, to fight an effective War on Terror, and pay tribute to U.S. service members engaged in the conflict abroad. In

addition, both candidates linked the impact of the War on Terror upon both domestic and foreign policies for America (although the Senator did this more broadly, than the President did). National security was the centralizing concept in the candidates' rhetoric and the basis upon which America's reputation and the success of all other domestic policies rested.

Summary

Although all themes of the coding index were found in both candidates' speeches, these themes took on different dimensions to frame and thereby limit the debate over America's response to 9/11. Responding to 9/11, arguing over prior wars, and contesting images of patriotism revealed how the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 set the stage for the candidates to embark on a foreign policy debate that reinforced U.S. power abroad. These major themes clarified how the candidates set the margins of the debate and reinforced the necessity of U.S. military supremacy and American political ideology. Although the candidates differed on the extent to which the United States relied on diplomacy versus force to face the threat that terrorism poses, neither questioned whether America had the right to democratize the Middle East. The key disagreements of the candidates' foreign policy platforms were tactical differences: whether an invasion of Iraq was necessary to fight terrorism or a distraction from the 'real' War on Terror. They also disputed the degree to which the United States should rely upon multilateralism to support its efforts to fight terrorism. Even though the candidates attempted to demonstrate their fitness to lead the War on Terror by constructing a distinctive response to terrorism, neither diverged from the belief that U.S. power was central to defeating terrorism.

Responding to 9/11 and its sub-themes, retelling 9/11, our enemies, and our allies, explored how the candidates re-constructed the events of 9/11 and what those events meant for U.S. supremacy abroad as well as the hatred that American idealism inspires. Therefore, the actions of our enemies did not merit deep analysis. Rather than stopping to reflect, it was instead essential to act to protect democracy and freedom for future generations of Americans and to bring hope to all oppressed peoples. The sub-theme, our allies, described the candidates' views on U.S. relations with nations that were considered friendly towards American interests. Senator Kerry insisted that decisions by U.S. leadership should consider the interests of the world community before taking action. However, the Senator agreed with the President that America had always reserved the right to defend itself and if elected President he would carry this tradition forward. Ultimately neither President Bush nor Senator Kerry questioned America's militarized response to 9/11, nor did they question America's right to dominate the international debate in response to terrorism.

The second major category, arguing over prior wars, demonstrated the candidates' descriptions of America's military might and leadership in previous global conflicts. Both of the candidates recalled how WWII heightened the nation's reputation at home and abroad. The President campaigned to bring freedom and democracy to Iraq just like his predecessor President Truman who had made allies of the nation's former enemy, the Japanese, following the end of WWII. Senator Kerry chose to highlight the contributions of President Franklin Roosevelt who throughout his presidency instituted social reforms that stimulated a war economy to modernize the U.S. military in order to improve the nation's ability to fight the Second World War. The first sub-theme, arguing over the

Vietnam Syndrome, clarified the candidates' positions on Iraq War policy. The President referred back to the success that President Truman had with establishing a democracy in Japan to demonstrate that his plan to win the war would succeed. Senator Kerry recalled his service during Vietnam to predict the failure of the President's policy for imposing internal peace and democratic governance upon Iraq, and the cost to U.S. soldiers and the nation's reputation abroad. The second sub-theme, arguing over previous wartime presidents, examined how the candidates compared their records in office to other Presidents who had successfully facilitated peace and sustained the nation's respect on the global stage. President Bush referred to leaders of both the Democratic and Republican parties who had undertaken global conflicts with unwavering leadership to question the Senator's voting record on military spending. Senator Kerry contrasted President Bush's ability to lead and his credibility with other world leaders to that of prior presidents, including the President's father, former President George H. W. Bush. The Senator reminded his audiences that earlier Presidents had successfully surmounted similar obstacles to national security that President Bush now faced without compromising the nation's ability to lead in crisis.

The final major theme, contesting images of patriotism evaluated the candidates' framing of what it meant to be American. This theme examined the importance of patriotism during wartime, especially in presidential campaign rhetoric. The candidates exhibited their ability to lead in terms of patriotic sentiment that engages the nation more during wartime than during peacetime. Both candidates used images of patriotism to question their opponent's ability to guide the nation through the War on Terror to a successful culmination. The President and the Senator agreed that bringing freedom to

Iraq, democratizing the Middle East, and supporting the troops in combat were the prescription for ending hostilities in Iraq and fighting an effective War on Terror. They disputed only the tactics that would accomplish their mutually shared objectives. For the President the Iraq War was central to the War on Terror and he pledged to commit all resources needed to achieve victory in order to democratize Iraq and the broader Middle East. The Senator viewed the war in Iraq as a diversion from the ‘real’ War on Terror that had not only overextended the military and domestic budgets, but also had fueled terrorist hatred for an American occupation. However, with the right leadership, the Senator believed that hostilities in Iraq could be ended by simultaneously assembling a broad international coalition to support military operations while engaging the Middle East in a serious debate about democracy.

The candidates’ campaign speeches provided the opportunity to explore how the dimensions of the debate were grounded in common themes. Even as the candidates addressed different audiences whose perspectives on the war might have differed according to the organization or group they were associated with, the candidates sustained a limited debate over the meaning of the attacks of 9/11 and the nation’s foreign policy response. These findings reflected a narrow spectrum of opinion over the place of U.S. power in world affairs. They demonstrated how alternative explanations for the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and alternative responses to military intervention remained unaddressed in “official” debate and hence “ways of seeing” war remained limited to the detriment of a wider public debate.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The candidates framed the War on Terror using ideas about U.S. power, freedom, and patriotism in their rhetoric to differentiate themselves from their opponent, but as they clarified their positions, they failed to distinguish themselves from one another in any significant way. The candidates used constructions of 9/11 to establish the right of the United States to lead the War on Terror in ways that ultimately facilitated a narrow debate over continuing U.S. leadership in global affairs. President Bush and Senator Kerry upheld the right of the United States to dominate the interpretation of world events and to act on these interpretations to establish American hegemony abroad as the only right, “natural order” of the global organization—the only alternative to safeguarding world peace in the face of terror. The main differences between the candidates were: how U.S. leadership should fight the War on Terror, whether the Iraq War was central to the war prior to its U.S. invasion, and the degree to which unilateralism or multilateralism were inextricably linked to a successful culmination of the hostilities in Iraq and a victorious end to the War on Terror.

Prior scholarly investigations examined political rhetoric for themes that constructed U.S. power abroad, which dominated the interpretation of events subsequent to 9/11 and legitimized the invasion of Iraq and the War on Terror. This study’s analysis of President Bush’s and Senator Kerry’s rhetoric contained similar themes to those found in prior research over this debate. The themes that guided analysis of the candidates’ speeches revealed that the President and the Senator conducted a narrow debate about the

meaning of September the 11th and terrorism that failed to challenge the underlying directives that always have guided U.S. foreign policy.

The candidates' rhetoric reinforced and maintained the idea that the United States is uniquely endowed with the right to democratize nations regardless of the local populace's desires through diplomacy and force if deemed necessary by U.S. leadership in order to defend and advance American freedom. The candidates sanctioned promoting freedom on the global stage to protect the interest of U.S. citizens; consequently, this ultimately reinforced the need to sustain American hegemony. The major themes and their sub-themes clarified how the President and the Senator constructed a narrow debate that reinforced the need to protect America interests abroad. Neither President Bush nor Senator Kerry questioned whether establishing a liberal democracy in Iraq was the right use of U.S. military strength in occupied Iraq, an effective means to curbing the power of militant Islam in the Middle East, or an effective method to fight terrorism.

9/11 Frames – Responding to 9/11, retelling 9/11, our enemies, and our allies

Responding to 9/11 and its sub-themes retelling 9/11, our enemies, and our allies framed how the candidates made meaning of 9/11 to maintain U.S. power in the global order. Prior investigations examined the techniques that U.S. leadership has used to set the perimeters of the debate over U.S. security. Following the end of the Cold War, the first President Bush ushered in the concept of the New World Order (NWO), a worldview similar to Cold War ideology, which premised U.S. power upon the essential moral righteousness of freedom. The ideology of the NWO is useful to understanding how U.S. leadership organizes the world to maintain and reproduce American hegemony through the identification of 'outcasts' who oppose the principles of the NWO (Lazar and Lazar

2004). NWO dialogue framed campaign debate and set the range of dispute between the candidates over who was the enemy and what strategy would defeat the enemy by “prepar[ing] the ground for future violence” (Leuder et al. 2002:244). President Bush and Senator Kerry continued to construct a response to 9/11, which the President had used to frame the War on Terror immediately following the attacks. The President positioned America as a force for good that was fighting the War on Terror to rid the world of evil (Coe et al. 2004). By placing the war as a battle between good and evil, the President was able to prepare the nation for war and provided the media with a “good news story” (Coe et al. 2004:237). Since the binary discourse found in the President’s rhetoric following 9/11 was “stylistically pleasing and therefore suppl[ied]...pithy sound bites” (Coe et al. 2004:237), the President had the moral authority to prepare the nation for military action in opposition to the enemy (Leuder et al. 2002; Butt et al. 2004). On national television before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush proclaimed, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Coe et al 2004). Presenting opposing dichotomies also helped the President and the Senator illustrate the necessity of defending freedom. Retelling 9/11 further clarified how the candidates introduced the debate over the moral disposition of U.S. leadership that made U.S. power integral to fighting tyranny and terrorism.

The candidates broadened the debate by disputing whether Saddam Hussein was a terrorist threat. However, they sustained the use of honorable images and dishonorable images (Murphy 2003; Merskin 2004) when discussing the U.S. removal of the dictator to divide the world between the competing forces of freedom and tyranny. In his

September 11, 2001 statement to the nation the President declared that “Our very freedom came under attack....America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world...thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror” (Merskin 2004). During the campaign, the President again defended his decision to invade Iraq and remove the dictator from power. On October 11 in New Mexico at a 2004 Campaign Rally the President insisted “Do I forget the lessons of September the 11th and take the word of a madman, or do I take action to defend our country?” The Senator contested the President’s choice of enemies on the campaign trail at Temple University on September 24, 2004. Senator Kerry argued that “George Bush made Saddam Hussein the priority. I would have made Osama bin Laden the priority.”

The candidates gave meaning to 9/11 by contextualizing the Iraq War and the War on Terror within moral constraints to establish a dialogue about protecting American lives by targeting terrorists for destruction. Responding to 9/11 captured the candidates’ argument for a U.S. led war against our enemies who feared the democratization of Iraq and the Middle East, and established a narrow debate over U.S. foreign policy that marginalized other interpretations of 9/11. The candidates failed to provide a critical perspective about the effectiveness of establishing freedom through militarization and therefore, they did not address the moral ambiguity of American hegemony.

At the Republican National Convention the President asserted that the “terrorists are fighting freedom with all their cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest fear,” and when the Senator spoke at Temple University during the campaign he agreed that, the outcome of the War on Terror “will determine whether we and our children live

in freedom or in fear.” The candidates disputed specific strategies to advance freedom and liberty abroad, but they did not question the integrity of U.S. foreign policy.

Although Senator Kerry was the opposition candidate, he remained loyal to the political elite. In order to prove his legitimacy as a candidate to the Washington Establishment, the Senator was unable to dispute established foreign policy directives. Ultimately, without a sizeable social movement that might legitimate a break with conventional wisdom, neither candidate was able to question the integrity of U.S. foreign policy without jeopardizing their bid for the presidency. Therefore, the right of the United States to fight to protect freedom remained central to the strategies both candidates proposed to combat terrorism. The candidates questioned whether their opponent’s leadership or their own would eliminate the power of radical Islamists, and manage international complaints about the way in which the war was conducted. The candidates disputed one another’s strategies based on who could forge a stronger coalition of allies through U.N. mandated procedures and sustain global support for the Iraq War and the broader War on Terror. Although they disputed whether Iraq was a threat prior to the U.S. occupation, they both agreed that terrorism threatened post-invasion Iraq and that the democratization of Iraq was essential for freedom to prevail and to preserve the American way-of-life.

War Frames – Learning from Prior Wars, arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, and arguing over previous wartime presidents

The candidates framed the Iraq War and the War on Terror by revisiting the conduct of American leaders who faced similar threats to national security. Learning from prior wars, arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, and arguing over previous wartime

presidents characterized this dimension of the debate between President Bush and Senator Kerry. In order to highlight whether or not the Iraq War and the War on Terror were wise investments of American military strength, the candidates gave an accounting of American involvement in prior global conflicts.

Similar to findings of other studies of war rhetoric, the 2004 Candidates urged the nation to put the safety and welfare of America above self-interest. Call-to-arms texts, like the speeches given by the President immediately following 9/11, serve to not only identify the enemy, but they also usher in a new era of threat that is symbolized by national unification against an enemy who endangers dearly held collective values (Graham et al. 2004). Although call-to-arms addresses pose as revolutionary, their reactionary nature actually serves “to preserve the status-quo of a particular group; they simultaneously – almost invariably – function to ultimately undermine the order which the reactionary forces seek to preserve” (Graham et. al. 2004:202). Five days following 9/11, the President reproduced the idea of the armed nation-state as the only legitimate force powerful enough to confront those who opposed freedom. As many of his predecessors had done in previous epochs, President Bush stated to a national audience that the “American people are used to conflict where there was a beachhead or a desert to cross” (Graham et al. 2004:211). In his rhetoric during the 2004 campaign, President Bush reminded an audience in New Mexico that “it wasn't all that long ago that we were fighting the Japanese;” and on the same day in New Mexico, Senator Kerry also reminisced with his supporters about events following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Senator stated, “In the summer of 1942, with the scars of Pearl Harbor still fresh, Americans were gearing up for battle.” Call-to-arms texts effectively maintain elite

hegemony over political ideas about life and country because competing ideas about war that threaten the “official” dialogue are marginalized in the public spaces (Graham et al. 2004). Learning from prior wars captured how the candidates compared the terrorist attacks on 9/11 to other times in the nation’s history when freedom was under attack. The candidates agreed that another attack on American shores must be avoided. The President and the Senator were in a unique position as presidential aspirants to direct public opposition to terrorism, maintain the authority of the state, and limit “official” debate over foreign policy matters and national security. Just as the defense of American interests following the attack on Pearl Harbor led to WWII and ultimately America was strengthened by that war’s outcome, the War on Terror according to the candidates would achieve the same ends if the nation rallied to the cause of freedom.

Because during wartime U.S. leadership is particularly dependent on presenting itself as an agent of freedom (Murphy 2003), it was important for the candidates to link their candidacy to historically significant conflicts, which encouraged the public to entertain particular ideas about the power of freedom over the enemy. President Bush claimed that the United States would make allies of the Iraqis through democratization, just as President Harry Truman had made allies of the Japanese following the end of WWII. The Senator chose to demonstrate his ability to lead in both foreign and domestic policy by illustrating how President Franklin Roosevelt used the imagination of Americans at home to generate technological innovation and create a diversified labor force to win WWII; and while simultaneously implementing social reforms that rewarded soldiers for their service upon their return home. The candidates defined the nature of U.S. power within a historical continuity that imparted the candidates’ vision for the

nation, which placed American freedom in opposition to militant Islamists, and simultaneously prepared the nation to continue the war effort (Coe et al. 2004; Butt et al. 2004; Leuder et al. 2002).

Arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome referred to the candidates' dispute over the threat Iraq posed to national security prior to the invasion and over the reliability of the intelligence that led to the President's decision to invade Iraq. The tactics that the United States implemented to limit and ultimately eliminate the power of militant Islam in Iraq was the basis upon which the candidates attacked one another's credibility in foreign policy matters related to the Middle East and terrorism. The President defended his administration's war policy in Iraq by refusing to acknowledge that an analogy could be drawn between his policy in Iraq and the policies of the Johnson administration during the Vietnam War. Instead, the President attacked the Senator's ambivalent voting record for troop funding to condemn Senator Kerry's position on the war as "a cut and run tactic" that would ultimately fail to secure freedom for future generations of Americans and Iraqis. In reply, Senator Kerry emphasized this analogy to strengthen his argument that the Iraq War was "the wrong war at the wrong time," and that the President's decision to invade Iraq ultimately weakened the nation's ability to defend itself. Just as the Vietnam War came to be viewed as an unnecessary escalation of American military commitments that ultimately did not stem the spread of Communist forces, Senator Kerry countered that the Iraq War had increased terrorist activity, instead of diminishing it. Although the candidates disagreed over who was a threat, ultimately both the Senator and the President maintained that America has the right to dictate the limits of its global power to oppose its enemies (Lazar and Lazar 2004; Butt et al. 2004). Even as the

candidates disputed the Iraq War, President Bush and Senator Kerry both feared Western ideas losing ground in the Eastern world if U.S. efforts to democratize Iraq failed. Thus, whose leadership, the President's or the Senator's would secure victory was pivotal to the dispute over Iraq.

Both the President and the Senator examined the leadership of former Presidents John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton to question their opponent's ability to unify America and other nations against terrorism and thereby return peace and order to the world. Both former President Kennedy and President Reagan successfully engaged the world community to combat Communism and establish world peace; and both the first President Bush and President Clinton engaged NATO forces to restore order in regional disputes. The President and the Senator presented a debate over the degree to which the United States should rely on multilateral diplomacy or military force, like their predecessors had, to achieve victory and the consequences for freedom if America did not succeed in securing Iraq.

Patriotism Frames – Contesting Images of Patriotism

The last major theme, contesting images of patriotism, captured how the candidates framed the debate over defining patriotism. The Senator widened the debate over American patriotism that the President had initiated immediately following 9/11, but Senator Kerry continued to emphasize that America had the moral authority to democratize Iraq to stabilize the Middle East and combat terrorism. Questions arose about whether the candidates' patriotism would negatively affect the nation's determination to continue combating terrorism. Conducting the Iraq War and the War on Terror were central to understanding how the dispute between the two candidates was

shaped by images of patriotism. They contested the values that a U.S. President must possess to successfully eliminate the power of militant Islamists.

To prove their fitness to lead the nation in the War on Terror, the candidates evoked the commitment of previous generations who served God's will to defend freedom against an immoral enemy. Similar to previous studies, this study found that battle between America and terrorism was a powerful mechanism to present the War on Terror as a test of "the nation's soul" (Murphy 2003:624). President Bush and Senator Kerry emphasized that just as previous generations of Americans had fought to preserve freedom, this generation must now defend freedom for their children and grandchildren or face the destruction of the American way-of-life. Two days following 9/11, the President addressed the American people to inspire them to take responsibility for their freedom and for the freedom of future generations of Americans. He reminded them of the task ahead "Our nation—this generation—will lift the dark threat of violence from our people and our future" (Murphy 2003). He reminded his constituents again as he announced his nomination for the 2004 Presidential Campaign that "I believe that America is called to lead the cause of freedom in a new century," because he believed, "freedom is not America's gift to the world, it is the Almighty God's gift to every man and woman in the world." Whereas Senator Kerry at the Democratic National Convention not only urged Americans to "remember the great idea of freedom for which so many have given their lives," he also challenged Americans to "reclaim democracy itself." Senator Kerry held that dissent "is the heart and soul of patriotism," and that he needed to ascertain that "we are on God's side."

The Senator questioned the validity of the President's conception of patriotism, which up until the election had remained unchallenged (Murphy 2003). The Senator disputed the frames that the President had put in place to launch the War on Terror, by redefining images of patriotism and service to country as he announced his candidacy: "You see that flag up there. We call her Old Glory... It draped the caskets of men I served with and friends I grew up with. For us, that flag is the most powerful symbol of who we are and what we believe in. Our strength. Our diversity. Our love of country. All that makes America both great and good. That flag doesn't belong to any president. It doesn't belong to any ideology and it doesn't belong to any political party. It belongs to all the American people." The candidates established their ability to lead the War on Terror by demanding of themselves and their constituents to honor the nation's history of fighting for freedom (Murphy 2003).

The President and the Senator agreed that America's founding commitment to democracy made American leadership essential to battling the terrorists, who feared freedom (Coe et al. 2004; Lazar and Lazar 2004; Merskin 2004), and also made America a natural ally to the those who opposed terrorism. When the President held a press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi, he reiterated that America was committed to fighting for Iraq's freedom: "If we stop fighting the terrorists in Iraq, they would be free to plot and plan attacks elsewhere, in America and other free nations. To retreat now would betray our mission, our word, and our friends. Mr. Prime Minister, America will keep it's commitments." Similarly, Senator Kerry stated on the campaign trail at Temple University that he believed that in the Middle East: "New generations must believe there is more to life than salvation through martyrdom...I know that it will be a long and

difficult struggle. I know we have to be resolute in confronting the evil that exists in the world. But in the end, one of our greatest strengths, one of our greatest safeguards, is that America can be the ideal that inspires others everywhere.”

Even as the candidates disputed one another’s ability to lead the nation forward, the candidates ultimately agreed that U.S. leaders must continue to support the nation’s mission abroad in order to inspire other peoples to pursue freedom. Both of the candidates agreed that funding the troops was essential to completing the mission, but they disputed the degree to which U.S. service members should be supported by government funds. In order to win the war the President promised to continue funding the troops who were combating terrorists. In contrast, the Senator predicted disastrous consequences for troop moral if a more rational approach was not adopted to provide service members with not only the equipment they needed to win the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror but also the resources they needed to establish civilian lives upon their return home. Senator Kerry advocated the American Dream not only for service members, the Senator insisted that it must be renewed for all of Americans. In addition, the Senator emphasized that renewing the American Dream at home also would inspire Iraqis and the Middle East to disavow the teachings of radical Islam. Paradoxically, the promise that America offers also reinforces the supremacy of America power abroad and allows the United States to dominate the global power structure.

The candidates disputed the meaning of freedom, but shared the goal of making the world safe for freedom. Since America was founded upon its citizen’s commitment to freedom, the candidates agreed that the United States held the unique right to protect freedom from terrorists and guard the nation’s well-being abroad. President Bush

considered his policy the only legitimate path to freeing Iraq, while simultaneously securing the nation from terrorism. Senator Kerry argued that the continuing forward with the President Bush's plan was a mistake. Tactics not only had to be changed on the ground in Iraq, but contention within the international community over the President's handling of Iraq and the War on Terror had to be resolved in order to return America and its military to a position of honor and strength.

Prior studies that examined President Bush's rhetoric following 9/11 revealed that the strategies the President used to make meaning of the terrorist attacks sanctioned state violence and opened a new epoch dominated by war. The War on Terror provided a familiar framework within which to understand the mechanisms that U.S. leaders use to appropriate power for the nation and thereby dominate the global superstructure with their ideas about freedom. These studies acknowledge that U.S. power is rooted in the belief that America is founded upon the most honorable government ever devised. Consequently its leaders are assumed to be imbued with the moral authority to lead the world toward freedom. But prior investigations of American hegemony fail to address that the nation's leaders also are empowered because they are located in the nexus of political and economic power. Prior investigations were sufficient to engage understanding about how the worldview of America has dominated global affairs. However, these studies failed to address how in conjunction with leaders' ability to project U.S. moral authority abroad and at home, specifically since 9/11, political leaders as members of the U.S. elite are in a position to claim that the American people share their will.

As members of the U.S. political elite, President Bush and Senator Kerry were uniquely positioned to dominate interpretation of the events subsequent to 9/11. They shaped their campaign rhetoric in the interest of the foreign policy objectives of the Washington Establishment to the detriment of a wider public debate over the meaning of freedom, while simultaneously marginalizing alternative explanations for 9/11. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1929), who spent years in prison (1929 to 1935) for his opposition to a Fascist state and eventually died while imprisoned, wrote that “one cannot choose the form of war one wants, unless from the start one has a crushing superiority over the enemy” (p. 234). Not only is Gramsci referring to battlefield incursions, but he is also referring to the power of the elite in democratic states to determine the range of debate about issues that are determined to be in the national interest (1929). According to Gramsci (1933), members of the elite political class, like President Bush and Senator Kerry, in advanced states, such as the United States, are able to define the range of acceptable debate over threats to national security because the candidates represent political parties that “provide the cultural and general ideological nature for a great movement of interrelated parties,” and are “fractions of one and the same organic party,” the political economic elite (pp. 149-150). In addition, the candidates were able to maintain and reproduce elite hegemony over the interpretation of the war because, according to Gramsci’s (1933) theory of hegemony, although the masses appear to have political influence, they actually “have no other political function than a generic loyalty, of a military kind, to a visible or invisible political centre” (p. 150). Consequently, Gramsci (1933) concludes that they are “kept happy by means of moralizing sermons, emotional stimuli, and messianic myths of an awaited golden age, in which all present

contradictions and miseries will be automatically resolved and made well” (p. 150). Because the superiority of U.S. military strength was a formidable foe to dispute and an effective means to enforce American hegemony, the candidates could promise a restoration of world peace and the return of national security through an eventual victory over terrorism. Not only does the power of American hegemony lie in the moral authority of its leaders, it is sustained through its leader’s connections to the political and economic elite, as well as the public’s conviction in their leaders’ moral authority.

Emile Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness explains why the candidates competing frames of the meaning of 9/11 and the War on Terror were informed by freedom and powerfully illustrated American hegemony over the form that democracy takes in Iraq and the Middle East. The President and the Senator were able to influence public opinion about the War on Terror not only because they were uniquely positioned to do so by virtue of their candidacy, but also because the hallmark of the collective consciousness in a democracy is the belief in “reciprocity of rights and duties” (Jones 2006:23). This belief encompasses the relationship between the individual and the state (Jones 2006). Furthermore, according to Durkheim’s theory of collective consciousness, in a democracy the state has a moral obligation to realize the “progressive liberation” of its citizens (Jones 2006:27). The debate between the candidates over the War on Terror not only reinforced the power of freedom, but it highlighted the point they disputed the most: whether their opponent’s strategies to fight the war would serve to preserve freedom at home by furthering democracy abroad. Most importantly Durkheim’s concept explains how the candidates’ war rhetoric was important to not only maintaining the promise that America offers to its citizens and to all who clamor for it;

collective consciousness also explains why the candidates endorsed the protection of American liberty by promoting freedom to those living under the oppression of Radical Islam.

The candidates' competing frames presented the meaning of freedom and terrorism and established the necessity of U.S. power abroad to protect national security. Ultimately, America's moral obligation to defend freedom narrowed the debate between the candidates over U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, the candidates' competing frames of American hegemony reinforced the nation's right to defend itself and export American values abroad to the detriment of a more critical debate about patriotism.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Typically it is thought the Republicans and the Democrats represent two distinct camps of thought, but this study found that the candidates from these two major political parties were in agreement over the use of American military strength and the role of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Although the candidates disputed whether Iraq was a central front of the War on Terror prior to the U.S. occupation, they agreed that only freedom and the democratization of Iraq would bring peace to Iraq and the Middle East. Both President Bush and Senator Kerry shared the same goals of protecting Americans at home and simultaneously ending hostilities in Iraq and fighting the War on Terror through the promotion of Western constructions of freedom. The candidates believed that freedom would dispel the power of Radical Islam in Iraq and the broader Middle East, although the tactics to implement this shared aim were disputed by the two men. Therefore, for the candidates, not only was the War on Terror a military strategy, it was also a quest to establish the supremacy of American hegemony over competing Eastern ideologies regarding how power should be organized.

Because President Bush and Senator Kerry believed that the founding principles of the nation gave the United States a legitimate right to advance freedom, they did not question whether the nation had the right to democratize regions of the world they believed were held hostage by terrorism. Traditional foreign policy perspectives informed the candidate's strategies to fight terrorism. Because foreign policy discourse has its basis in the notion that the America is a champion of the oppressed, it naturally follows that the United States is entitled to dictate the global power arrangement (Ken

Kyle 2001). Although the candidates disputed the strategies that maintain America benevolence in opposition to tyranny, they were in agreement over how the world should be organized. Following the principles of national security discourse (Kyle 2001), President Bush emphasized that America must safeguard the world for freedom to flourish. Senator Kerry argued that the President showed an over reliance upon the use of force to democratize Iraq and fight terrorism. However, he did not debate the discourse of progressive liberalism. Progressive liberalism is guided by the understanding that liberal democracy is preferable to other forms of governance (Kyle 2001). Therefore as the natural steward of freedom, the U.S. has the right to interfere in the governance of sovereign nations, such as Iraq, and establish a democracy. Although the candidates disputed the tactics that would liberate Iraq and the Middle East from militant Islam, they shared the belief that Western ideology was essential to promoting national security abroad to protect America from terrorism. The President's and the Senator's campaign rhetoric was bound to foreign policy objectives that ultimately, presented a debate favorable to U.S. hegemony, which informed "official" framing of the War on Terror.

According to media critics Robert McChesney and John Nichols, (2005), the U.S. press tends to look toward "official" sources to inform their news reports to frame the War on Terror in this country. U.S. debate is restricted typically by the "consensus among "official" sources on the benign role of the United States in the world" (McChesney and Nichols 2005:44). Since the candidates failed to provide a critical debate over the use of military of force or to dispute the consequences of American hegemony for oppressed peoples, George W. Bush and John Kerry were treated as the only two credible candidates by mainstream media. During the 2004 Campaign, the

media did not set the margins of debate by addressing the candidates' issues, as much as it set the margins of legitimate debate by reporting mostly on the candidates' chances of winning. They responded to the candidates' personal characteristics framed by attack ads run by the opposing party that failed to provide a deeper analysis into their opponent's platforms (McChesney and Nichols 2005). The candidates constructed a narrow debate over the inherent moral righteousness of the U.S. War on Terror. Because Senator Kerry, the opposition candidate, failed to challenge the credibility of the evidence put forth by the President in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, the media could not criticize either candidates without disrupting the status-quo. Consequently, the press debated the accuracy of the tactics that the two candidates claimed would end the hostilities in Iraq and win the War on Terror, instead of debating whether the invasion and occupation of Iraq broke international treaties (McChesney and John Nichols 2005). Therefore, challenges to presumptions about U.S. power over other nations were missing from mainstream media coverage of the campaign.

Douglas Kellner (2003), a professor of UCLA who examined the role of the media after September the 11th, made the point succinctly. According to Kellner:

Media events like party conventions and daily photo opportunities are concocted to project positive images of the candidates and to construct messages to sell the candidate to the public. These events are supplemented by a full range of media advertising that often attempts both to project negative images of the opposition candidate and positive images for the presidential aspirant. In an era of media spectacle, competing parties work hard to produce an attractive presidential "brand" that can be successfully marketed to the public (p. 107).

By examining the candidates' rhetoric as opposed to simply looking at how the media portrayed the candidates, I was able to identify how they conceptualized the Iraq War and the broader War on Terror on the campaign trail for the White House in 2004

without the added ambiguity that viewing the election through media frames often creates. Conversely, this is what makes it difficult for candidates who challenge the status-quo to receive meaningful mainstream media coverage. Even when their campaigns are reported, these candidates often are not treated as serious competitors. Alternative “ways of seeing” war put forth by the social justice movement and anti-war voices were fostered by events surrounding the question of U.S. involvement in Iraq, like the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal,²⁵ which frequently remained unaddressed by the mainstream media during the 2004 Election.

Alternative frames that question the legitimacy of U.S. power abroad gain momentum when previous tactics used by the state to maintain and reinforce public support for war begin to fail. Carl Boggs²⁶ (2000) argues that “potentially explosive sites of conflict typical of advanced capitalism are likely to embrace...powerful elements of rebirth: participatory democracy, a challenge to authoritarian rule, local community, linkage of the personal and the political, social forms of consumption, and so forth” (p.

²⁵ Reporter Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker Magazine and 60 Minutes broke the story that abuse and torture of detainees was taking place at the U.S. prison in Iraq in early May of 2004. Later, it was revealed that the US Army Criminal Investigation Command had been investigating the claims of abuse and torture since May 2003 when it published its findings in the Taguba Report in May 2004.

²⁶ Carl Boggs examines the diminishing civic space in *The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere*. He argues that the corporations have “colonized” our political system, our culture, and our daily experience in a country that is founded on a “limited democracy”, with little room for direct participation by citizens. He emphasizes that the public space for citizens to participate in governmental decisions has been subsumed by corporate values, which do not emphasize social expenditures, but instead emphasize competition, individual rights, and freedom of opportunity.

254). The social justice movement symbolized their opposition to President Bush's framing of the Iraq War by establishing Camp Casey in honor of Cindy Sheehan's son, who died fighting in Iraq, outside of the President's ranch in Texas during the summer of 2004. Since that time, Sheehan announced at the Midwest Peace and Justice Summit on April 13, 2007 that she is spearheading a movement to launch a rehabilitation center at Camp Casey to help returning veterans heal from the psychological and spiritual wounds of combat in Iraq.²⁷ Recent revelations of the deteriorating conditions found in Veteran Administration's medical system,²⁸ legitimates the idea of facilitating the recovery of veterans through grassroots organizing.

Alternative frames gain credibility when the public perceives that the federal government fails to respond to public concerns responsibly and the story receives widespread press coverage. The federal government's inept, and seemingly callous response to Hurricane Katrina²⁹ was heavily televised and popular mainstream media

²⁷ The author of this study attended Cindy Sheehan's speaking engagement at the Midwest Peace and Justice Summit held on the Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis April 13-14, 2007.

²⁸ See the February 20, 2007, Washington Post article, "Hospital Investigates Former Aid Chief: Walter Reed Official Had Own Charity," for a report about the crisis within the Veteran Administration.

²⁹ In addition, the recovery effort was hampered by the instrumentalization and rationalization of bureaucracies, such as FEMA, whose mission was broadened to respond to national emergencies like 9/11, in addition to natural disasters. Prior to the reorganization of FEMA under the Homeland Security Department, FEMA's guiding principle was to respond to national disasters. The reorganization of FEMA using the model of bureaucratic "streamlining" that has made the transfer of capital among multinationals profitable, has caused the national government to be ineffective in its re-building efforts after Katrina.

reporters like Anderson Cooper of CNN challenged the President's management of the disaster. Key to this criticism argued by members of the media was the limited availability of the National Guard to respond to this crisis. Traditionally such forces have been largely dedicated to helping in national disasters. However, since the President and his administration have relied heavily on this force to carry out missions in Iraq to fight the broader War on Terror, the Guard's ability to respond became limited. Not only was the Guard missing the needed numbers of service members to deal with the tragedy, much of their equipment that was needed to help them respond effectively to hurricane victims was in Iraq. Because the government would not risk the mission in Iraq, it could not move the Guard's equipment effectively to help Americans victimized by the hurricane. Uncontrollable events, like Hurricane Katrina, exposed the inefficiency and mismanagement of the Iraq War in a very palatable way to the public, thereby strengthening the criticisms made by the anti-war and social justice movement.

According to Boggs, "sites of conflict" like the disputed relationship over allocation of resources to the management of domestic and foreign crises, aid the formation of local enclave movements and identity movements, such as the anti-war and social justice movement, by providing an access point for social movements to challenge government policy (2000). "Sites of conflict" provide important points of rebirth for social movements to attack the institutional structures, which dominate political decision-making (Boggs 2000). Furthermore, dominant frames of understanding war become undermined when alternative constructions that frame U.S. foreign policy in opposition to freedom and peace gain traction. Ultimately, the moral authority of the state is consensual. If the public doubt the credibility of their leaders, then public opinion begins

to shift toward rejecting “official” interpretations of war.³⁰ These alternative “ways of knowing” fill the gap left by the rejection of “official” explanations and thus provides an alternative version of 9/11 and the War on Terror, which opposes the ideology of American hegemony.

The crisis of Hurricane Katrina was so shockingly exposed by government waste and inefficiency that it became a major news story that exposed the latent inequalities that are largely invisible and easily ignored otherwise. This made it easier for grassroots social movements to challenge widely held assumptions about equality and opportunity that are bound up in the American Dream. In addition, since the 2004 Election, the Iraq War has increasingly become unpopular among the American public who were promised a quick and inexpensive war by the President. The 2006 Congressional Races were often won, even if by a slim margin, by candidates who promised to bring an end to American involvement in Iraq and were critical of the way the war was conducted.

This study not only suggests the existence of competing frames but it also suggests that the media aids “official” frames to marginalize competing ideas about democracy, because opposing ideas about war and peace challenge where the margins of debate are set by “official” dialogue. When crises are not effectively managed by government policy and U.S. leaders do not fulfill the commitments they have made to the

³⁰ Kristen Breitweiser in her book, *Wake-up Call: the Political Education a 9/11 Widow*, recounts how Americans like herself who ordinarily would not align themselves with social justice and peace movement also come to dispute “official” framing of the War on Terror.

American public, political leaders' moral authority and their ability to frame "official" debate can be challenged.

Because the findings of this study clarify how our political leaders set the margins of debate by excluding a broad range of opinion over important issues of national security, it is important that our discipline continues to deepen sociological understanding about "official" "ways of seeing" war. Furthermore, in order to evaluate whether the political system in the United States is truly serving the interests of its people, research should be undertaken to not only aid public understanding, but to clarify the reasons that competing frames arise that contradict "official" "ways of seeing" war. In addition, a closer examination of the relationship between the media and the policy makers in Washington would illuminate the process of how particular frames about important public policy come to dominate our understanding of the world. A broader analysis of the conditions that lead to the rise of alternative frames that challenge "official" thinking about war would provide an opportunity to investigate why social change endures. In addition, an analysis of social change would provide an opportunity to explore the conditions that impede or facilitate the possibility for social change, as well as evaluate the ability of social movements to influence public opinion and "official" policy

APPENDIX A

TABLES A1-A3 – DOCUMENTS BEFORE SAMPLING

Table A1 – National Addresses of Candidates

National Addresses	Date	Location
Democratic Convention Nomination Speech	July 29, 2004	Boston, Massachusetts
Republican Convention Nomination Speech	September 2, 2004	New York City, New York
Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate	September 30, 2004	Coral Gables, Florida
Concession Speech	November 3, 2004	Boston, Massachusetts
Re-election Acceptance Speech	November 3, 2004	Washington, D.C.

Table A2 – Speeches of Candidates in Elected Capacity

Candidate	Speech Name	Date	Location
Bush	Proclaims Patriot Day	September 10, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Kerry	Democratic National Radio Address	September 11, 2004	Unknown
Bush	President Bush and Prime Minister Allawi Press Conference	September 23, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Bush	Thanks Red Cross Schoolchildren for Helping Russian Terror Victims	September 24, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Bush	The President Discusses Iraq Report	October 7, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Bush	Presidential Radio Address	October 9, 2004	Unknown
Bush	Presidential Radio Address 2	October 16, 2004	Unknown
Kerry	Democratic National Radio Address: This Election Will Be in Your Hands	October 30, 2004	Unknown

Table A3 – Rally Speeches of Candidates

Candidate	Issue	Date	Location
Kerry	Remarks at the Unity 2004 Conference	August 1, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Kerry	Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Annual Convention	August 18, 2004	Cincinnati, Ohio
Kerry	Speech to the International Association of Firefighters	August 19, 2004	Boston, Massachusetts
Kerry	The Fundamental Choice	August 24, 2004	New York City, New York
Bush	Remarks to Miami	August 27, 2004	Miami, Florida
Bush	Remarks to the American Legion Convention	August 31, 2004	Nashville, Tennessee
Kerry	Remarks to the American Legion Convention	September 1, 2004	Nashville, Tennessee
Kerry	A New Course for America	September 2, 2004	Springfield, Ohio
Bush	Victory 2004 Rally in Missouri	September 6, 2004	Poplar Bluff, Missouri
Kerry	Remarks in Racine, West Virginia	September 6, 2004	Racine, West Virginia
Kerry	Bush's Wrong Choices in Iraq that Have Left Us Without Resources	September 8, 2004	Cincinnati, Ohio
Kerry	Speech to the Congressional Black Caucus Legislative Conference	September 11, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Kerry	Massachusetts 9/11 Fund: Third Anniversary Commemoration	September 11, 2004	Boston, Massachusetts
Kerry	Protecting America's Seniors	September 14, 2004	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Kerry	Remarks to the National Guard Association of the United States	September 16, 2004	Las Vegas, Nevada
Bush	Focus on Women's Issues Event	September 17, 2004	Charlotte, North Carolina
Bush	Victory 2004 Rally in New York	September 20, 2004	New York City, New York
Kerry	Speech at New York University	September 20, 2004	New York City, New York
Bush	Focus On Education Event	September 22, 2004	King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
Kerry	Speech at Temple University	September 24, 2004	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Candidate	Issue	Date	Location
Kerry	A New Choice for Middle Class Families	October 2, 2004	Orlando, Florida
Kerry	Remarks at East Mt. Zion Baptist Church	October 3, 2004	Cleveland, Ohio
Bush	Goal to Stay on Offense for Promoting Peace and Security	October 11, 2004	Hobbs, New Mexico
Kerry	Energy Independence	October 11, 2004	Santa Fe, New Mexico
Bush	Emphasizes Importance of Funding for Our Troops	October 16, 2004	Sunrise, Florida
Kerry	Remarks at Xenia High School	October 16, 2004	Xenia, Ohio
Bush	Kicks Off Walk the Vote Weekend	October 16, 2004	West Palm Beach, Florida
Bush	Fighting Terrorist Threat	October 18, 2004	Marlton, New Jersey
Kerry	Health Care in America	October 18, 2004	Tampa, Florida
Kerry	Choice of a Lifetime	October 19, 2004	Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
Kerry	A Fresh Start: Succeeding In Iraq and Winning Against Terrorism	October 20, 2004	Waterloo, Iowa
Kerry	A Fresh Start Science and Innovation	October 21, 2004	Columbus, Ohio
Bush	Lays Out Election's Five Key Choices Critical to Our Families and Our Future	October 22, 2004	Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
Bush	Touts More Choices for Consumers as Means for Controlling Healthcare Costs	October 22, 2004	Canton, Ohio
Kerry	A Fresh Start for Working Women	October 22, 2004	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Bush	Retirement Plans to Strengthen Benefits for Future Generations	October 23, 2004	Ft. Myers, Florida
Bush	Proudly Running on His Record	October 23, 2004	Lakeland, Florida
Bush	Highlights His Reform and Results for America's Hardworking Families	October 23, 2004	Melbourne, Florida
Bush	Progress Depends of Safety of Our Citizens	October 23, 2004	Jacksonville, Florida
Kerry	Speech at the Broward Center for the Performing Arts	October 24, 2004	Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Bush	New Term to Finish work of Promoting Democracy	October 25, 2004	Greeley, Colorado

Candidate	Issue	Date	Location
Bush	Whether Polls Up or Down, I'll Always Support Military	October 25, 2004	Council, Iowa
Kerry	Speech at University of Wisconsin at Green Bay	October 26, 2004	Green Bay, Wisconsin
Bush	Outlining Five Clear Choices for Voters	October 26, 2004	Cuba City, Wisconsin
Bush	Touts Tax Relief for Getting Economy Going Again, Helping Small Business	October 26, 2004	Richland Center, Wisconsin
Bush	Proud of His Record, Ready for Strong Victory on November 2 nd	October 26, 2004	Dubuque, Iowa
Bush	Coherent Vision, Taking Action, Keys to Leadership	October 27, 2004	Onalaska, Wisconsin
Bush	Reaffirms Unwavering Commitment to Supporting Troops in Harm's way	October 27, 2004	Vienna, Ohio
Bush	Looks to Continue Building Prosperity and Defending Our Values	October 27, 2004	Findlay, Ohio
Bush	Focused on Day that is Coming	October 27, 2004	Lititz, Pennsylvania
Kerry	Remarks at North High School	October 27, 2004	Sioux City, Iowa
Bush	Defends True Values of Our Families and Our Nation	October 28, 2004	Saginaw, Michigan
Bush	Sets Path for Next Four Year	October 28, 2004	Dayton, Ohio
Bush	Republicans and Democrats for Strength and Purpose	October 28, 2004	Yardley, Pennsylvania
Bush	With Governor Schwarzenegger in Ohio America Is Back	October 29, 2004	Columbus, Ohio
Bush	Pays Tribute to Family Members of 9/11 Victims	October 29, 2004	Manchester, New Hampshire
Bush	As Election Day Nears Urges Ohioans to Keep Up the Great Work	October 29, 2004	Toledo, Ohio
Bush	Tough Strategies to Combat Threat Unlike Any We Have Faced	October 29, 2004	Portsmouth, New Hampshire
Kerry	Four Days to Change America	October 29, 2004	Orlando, Florida
Bush	Touts Vision That Spreads Prosperity to Every Corner of America	October 30, 2004	Grand Rapids, Michigan
Bush	Progress Depends on Safety of American People	October 30, 2004	Ashwaubenon, Wisconsin
Bush	Rallies Floridians for Final 48 Hour Get Out the Vote	October 31, 2004	Tampa, Florida

Candidate	Issue	Date	Location
Bush	Rallies Diverse Group of Supporters to Stand for Steady, Strong Leadership	October 31, 2004	Coconut Grove, Florida
Bush	America's Future Safety and Prosperity on the Ballot	October 31, 2004	Gainesville, Florida
Bush	Promotes Unwavering Confident Leadership	October 31, 2004	Cincinnati, Ohio
Bush	Carries Pre-Election Day Momentum into Ohio Says Choice	November 1, 2004	Wilmington, Ohio
Bush	Excited and Optimistic as He Lays Out Vision for Days Ahead	November 1, 2004	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Bush	Motivates Iowans During Campaign Sprint to the Victory Finish	November 1, 2004	Des Moines, Iowa
Bush	Remind Voters to go to the Polls	November 1, 2004	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Bush	Just Hours from Casting First Iowa Ballots Supporters Join President	November 1, 2004	Sioux City, Iowa
Bush	With Your Help I'll Carry Honor and Dignity of Presidency	November 1, 2004	Albuquerque, New Mexico
Bush	On Final Lap to Victory Stops in Dallas to Rally the Vote	November 2, 2004	Dallas, Texas

APPENDIX B

TABLES B1-B3 – DOCUMENTS IN SAMPLE

Table B1 – National Addresses of Candidates

National Addresses	Date	Location
Democratic Convention Nomination Speech	July 29, 2004	Boston, Massachusetts
Republican Convention Nomination Speech	September 2, 2004	New York City, New York
Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate	September 30, 2004	Coral Gables, Florida
Concession Speech	November 3, 2004	Boston, Massachusetts
Re-election Acceptance Speech	November 3, 2004	Washington, D.C.

Table B2 – Speeches of Candidates in Elected Capacity

Candidate	Speech Name	Date	Location
Bush	Proclaims Patriot Day	September 10, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Kerry	Democratic National Radio Address	September 11, 2004	Unknown
Bush	President Bush and Prime Minister Allawi Press Conference	September 23, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Bush	Thanks Red Cross Schoolchildren for Helping Russian Terror Victims	September 24, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Bush	The President Discusses Iraq Report	October 7, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Bush	Presidential Radio Address	October 9, 2004	Unknown
Bush	Presidential Radio Address 2	October 16, 2004	Unknown
Kerry	Democratic National Radio Address: This Election Will Be in Your Hands	October 30, 2004	Unknown

Table B3 – Rally Speeches of Candidates

Candidate	Issue	Date	Location
Kerry	Remarks at the Unity 2004 Conference	August 1, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Kerry	Remarks to the American Legion Convention	September 1, 2004	Nashville, Tennessee
Kerry	A New Course for America	September 2, 2004	Springfield, Ohio
Kerry	Speech to the Congressional Black Caucus Legislative Conference	September 11, 2004	Washington, D.C.
Kerry	Massachusetts 9/11 Fund: Third Anniversary Commemoration	September 11, 2004	Boston, Massachusetts
Kerry	Health Care and America's Seniors	September 14, 2004	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Bush	Victory 2004 Rally in New York	September 20, 2004	New York City, New York
Bush	Focus On Education Event	September 22, 2004	King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
Kerry	Speech at Temple University	September 24, 2004	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Kerry	A New Choice for Middle Class Families	October 2, 2004	Orlando, Florida
Kerry	Remarks at East Mt. Zion Baptist Church	October 3, 2004	Cleveland, Ohio
Bush	Goal to Stay on Offense for Promoting Peace and Security	October 11, 2004	Hobbs, New Mexico
Kerry	Energy Independence	October 11, 2004	Santa Fe, New Mexico
Bush	Emphasizes Importance of Funding for Our Troops	October 16, 2004	Sunrise, Florida
Kerry	Remarks at Xenia High School	October 16, 2004	Xenia, Ohio
Bush	Kicks Off Walk the Vote Weekend	October 16, 2004	West Palm Beach, Florida
Kerry	A Fresh Start Science and Innovation	October 21, 2004	Columbus, Ohio
Bush	Lays Out Election's Five Key Choices Critical to Our Families and Our Future	October 22, 2004	Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
Bush	Touts More Choices for Consumers as Means for Controlling Healthcare Costs	October 22, 2004	Canton, Ohio

Candidate	Issue	Date	Location
Bush	Retirement Plans to Strengthen Benefits for Future Generations	October 23, 2004	Ft. Myers, Florida
Bush	Highlights His Reform and Results for America's Hardworking Families	October 23, 2004	Melbourne, Florida
Bush	New Term to Finish work of Promoting Democracy	October 25, 2004	Greeley, Colorado
Bush	Whether Polls Up or Down, I'll Always Support Military	October 25, 2004	Council Bluffs, Iowa
Bush	Touts Tax Relief for Getting Economy Going Again, Helping Small Business	October 26, 2004	Richland Center, Wisconsin
Bush	Proud of His Record, Ready for Strong Victory on November 2 nd , Tuesday	October 26, 2004	Dubuque, Iowa
Bush	Reaffirms Unwavering Commitment to Supporting Troops in Harm's way	October 27, 2004	Vienna, Ohio
Bush	Looks to Continue Building Prosperity and Defending Our Values	October 27, 2004	Findlay, Ohio
Bush	Defends True Values of Our Families and Our Nation	October 28, 2004	Saginaw, Michigan
Bush	With Governor Schwarzenegger in Ohio America Is Back	October 29, 2004	Columbus, Ohio
Kerry	Four Days to Change America	October 29, 2004	Orlando, Florida
Bush	Rallies Floridians for Final 48 Hour Get Out the Vote	October 31, 2004	Tampa, Florida
Bush	Rallies Diverse Group of Supporters to Stand for Steady, Strong Leadership	October 31, 2004	Coconut Grove, Florida
Bush	Promotes Unwavering Confident Leadership	October 31, 2004	Cincinnati, Ohio
Bush	Excited and Optimistic as He Lays Out Vision for Days Ahead	November 1, 2004	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Bush	Motivates Iowans During Campaign Sprint to the Victory Finish	November 1, 2004	Des Moines, Iowa

APPENDIX C

TABLES C1-C3 – THEMES

Table C1 – Coding Index of Preliminary Themes

Preliminary Theme	Summary
Retelling 9/11	restating and offering explanations for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 to give meaning to the loss of American lives
Victimizing citizens	Americans who died or who were injured in attacks on the World Trade Centers (WTC) in New York City (NYC) on September 11, 2001
Saving citizens	first responders and others who saved the lives of survivors during and after the attacks on the WTC in NYC, at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; and the passengers on United Flight 93 whose plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania in their attempt to prevent a terrorist attack on the White House on September 11, 2001
Responding to 9/11	U.S. responds to the terrorist threat with the War on Terror to prevent another direct attack on the homeland and fight terrorism abroad by democratizing the Middle East.
Storytelling	romanticizing American history to promote an altruistic view of war
Hero Making	the bravery and heroic efforts of first responders and others to save fellow citizens on 9/11 indicate national character and symbolize what it means to be an “American”
Liberating	descriptions of the U.S. freeing Iraqis from terrorism and tyranny to enjoy democracy
Trusting in the Faith and Spirit of America	conviction in the principles the nation embodies—freedom, liberty, and justice
Proclaiming the Future of America	predicting America and Iraq will be free from terrorism after the War on Terror is won
Defining the President’s Role	the candidates define the duties of a wartime presidency
Characterizing U.S. Soldiers	depicting the character of U.S. service members fighting the Iraq War
Characterizing Our Enemies	nations, groups, and individuals who oppose the Iraq War and the War on Terror and who are hostile to U.S. interests abroad
Characterizing Our Allies	nations who joined the U.S. coalition in Iraq and who are friendly to U.S. interests abroad

C2 –Taxonomy of Final Themes, Sub-themes, and Summary of Debate

Final Theme and Sub-theme(s)	Dimensions of Themes
Responding to 9/11	defined the War on Terror; disputed the link between 9/11 and the Iraq War; connected the democratization of the Middle East to U.S. security
disputed theme	
Bush	Iraq was a terrorist threat prior to invasion
Kerry	Iraq was a terrorist threat because of an extended U.S. occupation
retelling 9/11	accounting of 9/11; introduced the debate that framed foreign policy response to 9/11; linked the events of 9/11 either directly or indirectly to the War on Terror; i.e., commonly referred to the loss of life on September the 11th that the World Trade Center with the number 3,000 when they described the War on Terror (the sub-themes victimizing citizens and saving citizens were collapsed into this category, see Table C1)
disputed theme	
Bush	linked 9/11 to Saddam Hussein to explain his decision to invade Iraq; argued that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s potential ability to spread nuclear technology to terrorist organizations, to finance their operations, and to give them protection from the U.S. would increase the risk of another ‘9/11 like’ attack occurring
Kerry	disputed the President’s analysis that Iraq was a terrorist threat and the invasion of Iraq was necessary to avoid another terrorist attack; not only had invasion created a terrorist threat from Iraq, but it had diverted the U.S. from capturing Osama Bin Laden and fighting the ‘real’ War on Terror in Afghanistan
our enemies	described who is responsible for 9/11 and who is a threat to national security; depicted an enemy who fears freedom and democracy; compared the threat of terrorism to past threats; i.e., democracy versus Communism, democracy versus militant Islam
disputed theme	
Bush	labeled Saddam Hussein as an enemy and associate of Al-Qaeda; labeled Osama bin Laden as an enemy
Kerry	labeled Saddam Hussein as an enemy of the Iraqi people, but not Americans; Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda are the ‘real’ enemy
our allies	reserved the right to implement a pre-emptive strike; disputed strategies to build coalitions with other nations to fight terrorism and the conditions to be met before a pre-emptive strike is launched

Final Theme and Sub-theme(s)	Dimensions of Theme
disputed theme	
Bush	Questioned the Senator's tactic of passing a "global test" with our allies and other nations before launching a pre-emptive strike at another nation; disputed whether the Senator would prioritize the national security interests of the U.S. over "rogue" nations
Kerry	Questioned whether the President followed the mandates of the U.N. prior to the invasion of Iraq; disputed the President's ability to build credibility with our allies and global community
Learning from Prior Wars	defined the historical role of U.S. military might in world affairs; interpreted WWII; i.e., compared Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and compared WWII to the War on Terror;
disputed theme	
Bush	bringing peace through democratization of the enemy; i.e., compared President Truman's democratization of Japan to the democratization of Iraq
Kerry	restoring the nation's reputation abroad to promote peace; i.e. Iraq War policy symbolizes failed domestic and foreign policies unlike President Franklin Roosevelt's war policies that led to the development of new technology, expanded the labor market, and advanced the nation's reputation
arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome	disputed the success of the President's Iraq War policy in combating terrorism
disputed theme	
Bush	steadfastness in pursuing victory in Iraq was essential to protect the freedom of Americans and protect the Iraq's fragile democracy; important to honor America's commitment to Iraq
Kerry	Vietnam should have taught the nation's foreign policy leaders to choose their battlefields more wisely and avoid ideologically ambiguous commitments of American military strength
arguing over previous wartime presidents	compared their war strategies and their opponent's war strategy to former presidents' war strategies to reinforce the urgency of principled leadership during war
disputed theme	
Bush	reviewed Senator Kerry's record of opposition to former Presidents' Reagan and Clinton foreign policy decisions on the Middle East, the Cold War, and military expenditures and questioned the Senator's loyalty to the values and goals symbolized by noteworthy Democratic leaders, like Senator Ted Kennedy

Final Theme and Sub-theme(s)	Dimensions of Theme
Kerry	contrasted the President Bush's ability to build alliances with the success his father, the first President Bush, had at coalition building during the Gulf War; as well as President Clinton, who relied on NATO forces to manage the fall-out from the Soviet collapse in Eastern Europe; and questioned the President's credibility with world leaders to fight terrorism to President Kennedy's handling of the Communist threat during the Cuban Missile Crisis
Contesting Images of Patriotism	used symbolism to exhibit patriotic sentiment that engages the nation more during wartime than during peacetime to question their opponent's ability to win the War on Terror; i.e., the will of God; agreed that establishing a democracy in Iraq and the greater Middle East and supporting the troops in combat was essential to ending hostilities in Iraq and to winning the War on Terror; only disputed the tactics that would accomplish mutually shared objectives
disputed theme	
Bush	images of God's will; i.e., proclaimed that freedom was not America's gift to the world, but God's gift to the world; pledged to commit all resources needed to bring victory in order to democratize Iraq and the broader Middle East since winning the Iraq War was central to combating terrorism and ultimately winning the War on Terror
Kerry	images of God's will; i.e., hoped that rather than God being on the side of the U.S., that the U.S. was on the side of God; the war in Iraq was viewed as a diversion from the 'real' War on Terror that overextended the military and domestic budgets and exacerbated terrorist hatred for an American occupation; believed with the right leadership that hostilities in Iraq could be ended by simultaneously assembling a broad international coalition to support military operations while engaging the Middle East in a serious debate about democracy and the liberty that it would bring to the oppressed

TABLE C3 – Themes Found in Prior Studies

Theme	Definition
Calling to Arms	"convincing people, en masse, to kill and die on behalf of some cause or other" (Graham, Keenan and Dowd 2004: 200)
Presenting Violence Publicly	"preparing the ground for future violence" (Leuder and Marshland 2002: 244)

Theme	Definition
Creating Honorable and Dishonorable Images	“craft[ing] the authority to dominate public interpretation of . . . events and the appropriate response to them” (Murphy 2003: 606)
Vilifying the Enemy	“consistently constructing Arabs as terrorists” to justify acts of violence based on socially sanctioned prejudice (Merskin 2004: 172)
Creating Binaries	“the placement of one thought or thing in terms of its opposite,” such as good versus evil (Coe, Domke, Graham, Lockett John, and Pickard 2004: 403)
Creating Targets of Violence and Protection	a directive that establishes whose lives are targeted for killing and whose lives are targeted for protection (Butt, Lukin, Matthiessen 2004)

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Research and Training Experience

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Professional Experience

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Awards

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Conferences Attended

“The War at Home: How Local Communities are Impacted by the War on Terror.” Paper Presented at the North Central Sociological Association (NCSA) Annual Conference. Indianapolis, Indiana. March 23-25, 2006.

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