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Item Law School Pedagogy Post-Pandemic: Harnessing the Benefits of Online Teaching(2021) Dutton, Yvonne M.; Ryznar, MargaretItem Ringing the Bell: The Right to Counsel and the Interest Convergence Dilemma(2017) Silva, Lahny R.Item Balancing Interests Under Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act: Using the Sword as well as the Shield(2022) Klein, Andrew R.Perhaps no existing law faces more scrutiny than Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230(c)”). At one level, it is a simple edict: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” At another level, the law packs a punch. As author Jeff Kosseff put it in the title of his recent book, Section 230(c) contains “the twenty-six words that created the Internet.” Enacted a quarter century ago to support a nascent industry, the law provides expansive immunity for internet companies that post third party content online. The consequences have provoked strong criticism from both sides of the political aisle. Those on the left assert that Section 230(c) allows large tech companies to profit from conduct that causes harm. Those on the right argue that it gives social media companies license to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Even one of the law’s original authors, Senator Ron Wyden, recently criticized Section 230(c), calling out tech companies’ lack of interest in self-moderation and warning that if “you don’t use the sword, there are going to be people coming for your shield.” An increasing number of commentators contend that it is time to rethink Section 230(c). This Article joins the fray by considering some of its applications that have flown under the radar, including several cases with fact patterns that have engendered frustratingly inconsistent decisions. In these cases, judges encounter situations where a defendant’s own conduct is at play—activity beyond simply republishing content. Although this would seem to take such claims outside Section 230(c)’s purview, some courts continue to apply immunity nonetheless, elevating concerns about chilling online activity above all else. The Article takes issue with those decisions, noting their conflict with analogous principles of secondary liability and expressing skepticism that broad immunity is necessary to serve the statute’s policy of encouraging activity on the internet. The Article also proposes a better way for courts to balance interests, drawing parallels to well-established defamation law principles that weigh plaintiffs’ ability to protect reputational interests against concerns about chilling speech.Item Retributive or Reparative Justice? Explaining Post-Conflict Preferences in Kenya(2022) Dutton, Yvonne; Aloyo, Eamon; Dancy, GeoffIn states emerging from mass violence and human rights abuses, do individuals prefer retributive punishment of perpetrators through trials, or do they wish to be compensated with land or monetary reparations for their injuries? How does the concrete option of prosecutions by the International Criminal Court (ICC) moderate these preferences? Using unique survey data from 507 Kenyans collected in 2015, we build on and add nuance to the empirical literature that interrogates the link between exposure to mass violence and post-conflict justice preferences. We find that while some individuals prefer reparative justice, victims and witnesses generally want perpetrators to be prosecuted. Even for those who are co-ethnics of government leaders – who allegedly instigated widespread killing, sexual assaults and displacements – direct exposure to those acts leads to greater desire for prosecutions. We further find that one’s personal experience with violence also leads one to reject domestic justice in favor of international justice: victims and witnesses who favored retributive justice are highly likely to believe that the ICC is the best option for prosecuting perpetrators.Item Stumbling Stones at Levittown: What to Do About Racial Covenants in the United States(2022) Roisman, Florence WagmanItem Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure 1995(1996) Dimitri, James D.; Elfenbaum, Randi F.; Rowe, Jodi KathrynThis Article highlights the significant changes effected by the Indiana General Assembly and appellate courts in 1995 in the area of criminal law and procedure.Item Race, Rhetoric, and Judicial Opinions: Missouri as a Case Study(2017) Desnoyer, Brad; Alexander, AnneUsing Missouri-based judicial opinions, this Essay demonstrates the influence of majoritarian narratives and how evolving rhetoric perpetuated stagnant narratives. In other words, these opinions, when viewed in histori- cal context, demonstrate how the "status quo narrative" continued in society even after the law changed. This Essay examines opinions centered on both the legal and de facto segregation of African Americans and whites in three landmark cases: State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,29 Kraemer v. Shelley,30 and Liddell v. Board ofEducation.Item Recent Developments Under the Indiana Rules of Evidence(1997) Cooper, Jeffrey O.This past year was the third year for the Indiana courts under the new regime of the Indiana Rules of Evidence, which took effect on January 1, 1994. Paralleling the two-decades-old Federal Rules of Evidence and similar rules adopted by many states, the Rules have effected a major dislocation of Indiana's prior approach to evidence questions. The courts have thus had to re-evaluate the rationales for their common-law decisions as part of the process of determining the extent of the changes made by the Rules. The cases that came before the courts during the time period covered by this survey required the courts to adopt new approaches to issues spanning the spectrum of evidence law. Although the adaptation to the new Rules can be expected to continue over the coming years, the Indiana courts have already begun to chart an independent path in their interpretations of the text of the Rules, departing in some significant ways from the approaches taken by the federal courts and by other state courts using analogous evidence rules. This Article surveys the major developments in Indiana evidence caselaw during the past year, organized according to the corresponding Articles in the Indiana Rules of Evidence.Item Mill, Freud, and Skinner: The Concept of the Self and the Moral Psychology of Liberty(1995) Hill, John LawrenceThis Article will explore and compare the philosophical psychologies of John Stuart Mill, Sigmund Freud, and B.F. Skinner, and will survey the socio-political implications of their respective views of human nature. The Article will seek to demonstrate generally that we cannot arrive at a unified vision of the most suitable social and political order without answering fundamental questions concerning what may variously be called human nature, human psychology, or the nature of the self. More specifically, this Article will contend that liberalism is contingent upon the traditional view of the person as free, rational, characterized by a functional psychological unity with an authentic core personality which exists independent of, and perhaps prior to, social influences. It will argue that psychoanalytic thought and behaviorism, the first two of three waves of modem psychology, both reject this view of the self." Thus, to the extent that modem psychology rejects the view of the self as free, rational, unified, and authentic or original to the person, it undermines the moral-psychological case for liberalism, including the idea of the zone of personal liberty. Put simply, the case for political liberalism re- quires our adherence to this traditional view of the self.