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Item Kant’s Philosophy of Moral Luck(Springer, 2021) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsIn the modern moral luck debate, Kant is standardly taken to be the enemy of moral luck. My goal in this paper is to show that this is mistaken. The paper is divided into six sections. In the first, I show that participants in the moral luck literature take moral luck to be anathema to Kantian ethics. In the second, I explain the kind of luck I am going to focus on here: consequence luck, a species of resultant luck. In the third, I explain why philosophers have taken Kantian ethics to reject moral luck and, in particular, consequence luck. In the fourth, I explain why these philosophers are mistaken, and I set out Kant’s theoretical framework for consequence luck. In the fifth, I clarify and defend this framework, and in the sixth, I interrogate and attack it.Item Farouk Seif’s Hypostatic Semiotic Metaphysics(Philosophy Documentation Center, 2020) De Tienne, André; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsItem Preface to Ivo Ibri’s volume 2 of his Semiotics and Pragmatism: Theoretical Interfaces(Editora Oficina Universitária, 2021) De Tienne, AndréItem Kant, the Practical Postulates, and Clifford’s Principle(Brill, 2020) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsIn this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have endorsed this principle.Item How Does Religion Affect Giving to Outgroups and Secular Organizations? A Systematic Literature Review(MDPI, 2020-08) Yasin, Kidist Ibrie; Graeser Adams, Anita; King, David P.; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsAlthough religious giving represents the largest sector of charitable giving in the US, its overall impact on social welfare has been questioned, pointing to the possibility that the majority of funding might stay within the religious community, with little benefit to outgroups or secular charity. Despite multiple studies showing a positive relationship between religion and secular and outgroup giving, some empirical findings show a negative or non-significant relationship. By employing a systematic literature review, the current study explores theories and empirical evidence to provide an integrative framework that identifies the mechanisms and directions through which religion affects giving to outgroups and secular organizations. The study also compares the major five religious traditions and giving to outgroups and secular organizations. The study finds that religious teachings, norms, values, social network, and private rituals, determine the direction of the relationship between religion and giving to outgroups and secular organizations. The study concludes that, despite the dominant positive relationship between religion and giving to outgroup and secular organizations, there remains heterogeneity among the studies based on their location, operationalization of religion and secular giving, and methodology used. The study also poses some implication questions and points out future research directions.Item A Dilemma for Mathematical Constructivism(Springer, 2021) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsIn this paper I argue that constructivism in mathematics faces a dilemma. In particular, I maintain that constructivism is unable to explain (1) the application of mathematics to nature and (2) the intersubjectivity of mathematics unless (3) it is conjoined with two theses that reduce it to a form of mathematical Platonism. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I explain the difference between mathematical constructivism and mathematical Platonism and I outline my argument. In the second, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics applies to nature for a constructivist is a thesis I call Copernicanism. In the third, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics can be intersubjective for a constructivist is a thesis I call Ideality. In the fourth, I argue that once constructivism is conjoined with these two theses, it collapses into a form of mathematical Platonism. In the fifth, I confront some objections.Item Prolegomenon to Horosemiotics: Semiotic Ramifications of a Peircean Borderline Distinction(Philosophy Documentation Center, 2019-07-01) De Tienne, André; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsItem Postprandial Peirce: A Final Talk(Indiana University, 2020) De Tienne, André; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsThis is the transcript of a public conversation held by a medium with Peirce's spiritual consciousness following an excellent dinner in the Delmonico Room at the Hôtel Fauchères in the evening of April 19, 2019, the 105th anniversary of Peirce's death. The transcript testifies to the continued reality of metaphysics in the afterlife, where one encounters the ultimate community of inquiry. It provides a number of revelations soundly supported by intricate semiotic distinctions. It also sets the methodological ground for a new subdiscipline of metaphysics open to a wide range of creative applications.Item How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head(Oxford, 2020-01) Carmichael, Chad; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsThe ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon has given rise to a surprising array of apparently implausible views. For example, in order to solve the puzzle, several philosophers have been led to deny the existence of their own feet, others have denied that objects can gain and lose parts, and large numbers of philosophers have embraced the thesis that distinct objects can occupy the same space, having all their material parts in common. In this paper, I argue for an alternative approach: I claim that human beings have ordinary parts—hands, heads, feet, and so on—but no extraordinary parts, such as ‘foot-complements’, the existence of which is essential to the puzzle. I rebut three objections to this approach: an objection that it is unacceptably metaphysically arbitrary, an objection that the view is incompatible with versions of the puzzle involving decapitation, and an objection concerning masses of matter. If we can believe that there are such things as hands and feet without involving ourselves in paradox, and without accepting large numbers of co-located material objects that share all their material parts, then that is what we should do. My view is the only known alternative which allows this.Item Genetic Data Aren't So Special: Causes and Implications of Reidentification(Wiley, 2020-10-23) Kasperbauer, T.J.; Schwartz, Peter H.; Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsGenetic information is widely thought to pose unique risks of reidentifying individuals. Genetic data reveals a great deal about who we are and, the standard view holds, should consequently be treated differently from other types of data. Contrary to this view, we argue that the dangers of reidentification for genetic and nongenetic data—including health, financial, and consumer information—are more similar than has been recognized. Before different requirements are imposed around sharing genetic information, proponents of the standard view must show that they are in fact necessary. We further argue that the similarities between genetic and nongenetic information have important implications for communicating risks during consent for health care and research. While patients and research participants need to be more aware of pervasive data-sharing practices, consent forms are the wrong place to provide this education. Instead, health systems should engage with patients throughout patient care to educate them about data-sharing practices.